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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Section 78-2a3(2)(j) UCA (1953).
By Orders dated September 13, 1990 and March 5, 1991, the
Supreme Court poured Western's and Smiths' Appeals over to this
Court for disposition.

(900495-CA and 910131-CA)

On March 19, 1991, both Appeals were consolidated as 900495CA.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
(Including standards of review and supporting authority)
1.

Do waiver, estoppel and the principle that claims and

defenses not raised in the trial court cannot be considered on
appeal preclude Western from denying its responsibility to pay
Smiths

the

reasonable

value

of

their

professional

time and

services defending Smiths and Western against Plaintiffs' claims?
The trial court's resolution of legal issues is reviewed
under a correction of error standard.
P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989).

Doelle v. Bradley, 784

The Court of Appeals will not consider

issues not presented to the trial court.

Broberg v. Hess, 782

P.2d 198 (Utah App. 1989).
2.

Does

Western's

failure

to

marshal

the

evidence

supporting the trial court's indemnity awards to Smiths for their
professional
demonstrate

defense

services

insufficiency

and

thereof

failure

require

to

endeavor

affirmance

of

to
the

awards?
To attack findings of fact, an appellant must first marshal
all of the evidence supporting the findings and then demonstrate
that even if viewed in the light most favorable to the appellee,
the evidence is legally insufficient to support them.
Bradley, supra.

Doelle v.

3.

Are the indemnity awards for Smith's professional time

and services supported by substantial competent evidence?
The trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside
unless

clearly

opportunity

of

witnesses.
4.

erroneous,
the

with

due

regard

given

to

the

trial court to judge the credibility of

Rule 52(a) URCP and Doelle v. Bradley, supra.

Is the trial court's characterization of Smith's defense

time as indemnifiable expense under Section 16-10-4[o](3) UCA
(1953) (now Section 16-10-4(2)(c)) a proper application of the
statute in accord with its purpose?
The trial court's resolution of legal issues is reviewed
under a correction of error standard.
5.

Doelle v. Bradley, supra.

Is Western entitled to take Smith's expert accounting

defense services without paying for them?
If there is a reasonable basis in the evidence, a trial
courts award of damages will be affirmed on appeal.

Gillmor v.

Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1987).
6.

Does

Western's

supporting

the

trial

reasonable

attorney's

failure

court's

to

indemnity

marshall
award

the

evidence

to

Smiths for

fees for their defense and

failure to

endeavor to demonstrate insufficiency thereof require affirmance
of the award?
To attack findings of fact, an appellant must marshall the
supporting evidence and demonstrate its insufficiency.

Doelle v.

Bradley, supra.
7.

Is the indemnity awarded for reasonable attorney's fees

for Smith's defense supported by substantial evidence?
Findings
erroneous.
(Utah 1989).

of

fact will not be

set aside unless clearly

Rule 52(a) URCP and Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176

8.

Was

pre-judgment

interest properly

allowed

on the

indemnity awarded?
The trial court's determination of legal issues is reviewed
under a correction of error standard.
9.

Doelle v. Bradley, supra.

Are Smiths entitled to recover their costs of seeking

indemnif ication?
The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed under a
correction of error standard.

Doelle v. Bradley, supra.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
The determinative statute is the indemnification section of
Utah

Corporation

Code,

Section

16-10-4(o)

UCA

(1953),

particularly subparagraph (3). In 1987 this statute was amended
in grammatical form, but not in substance.
statute

now

Subparagraph

appears
(3)

of

as

the

Section
pre-1987

The indemnification

16-10-4(2)
version

was

UCA

(1953).

continued

as

subparagraph (c) of the amended statute with only inconsequential
grammatical changes.
Section 16-10-4(o), Utah Code Annotated (1953) is set forth
in full in Addendum I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Defendant,

Appellant

and

Cross

Appellee

Western

Auto

Radiator Co., Inc., "Western", is a closely held Utah corporation
long engaged in the business of repairing radiators and air
conditioner systems in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Prior to December 1977, Western had one class of common
stock (except for one share issued to Defendant, Appellee and
Cross Appellant Willard L. Smith) all of which was owned by
Defendant William W. Bowerbank, "Bowerbank".
Late in 1977 a means was developed, with the aid of CPA

Willard L. Smith, who had long served Western's accounting, tax
reporting and business advice needs, by which Western's employees
could purchase Western's

stock

from Bowerbank with Western's

profits.
In December 1977, four of Western's employees, Plaintiffs
Blaine Goodrich, David L. Hoyt, Val G. Kidman and Sterling C.
Jones, contracted with Bowerbank to purchase his preferred stock
for $200,000.00 payable over ten years.
In January 1982, the same four employees and one additional
employee, Plaintiff Daniel Wayman, contracted with Bowerbank to
purchase his common stock for $100,000.00, payable over time.
Western agreed to pay monthly bonuses to the purchasers
sufficient to make all stock purchase payments.
The

1982

agreement

directors and officers.

established

a

contractual

board

of

The contract directors were two of the

purchasing employees, Blaine Goodrich and Daniel Wayman, stock
seller Bowerbank's two sons, Jonathan and Kim Bowerbank and two
independent CPA's, Defendants, Appellees and Cross Appellants
Willard L. Smith and Keith C. Smith ("Smiths").

The contract

officers were Willard L. Smith, President and Chairman of the
Board of Directors, Jonathan Bowerbank, Vice President, Blaine
Goodrich, Secretary and Keith C. Smith, Treasurer.
The 1982 agreement provided Western would provide Bowerbank
an automobile, fringe benefits, and could use his services as a
consultant for reasonable compensation.
A consulting agreement was signed by Bowerbank and Western
under which Bowerbank agreed to assist Western in various ways
for $500.00 per month.
Under an additional January 1982 contract, Bowerbank sold
Western the land and building Western had been renting.
A

The

price was made payable over fifteen years.
Western

continued

to

operate

profitably.

Smiths

administered performance of the contracts, accrued stock purchase
bonuses to the purchasing employees and paid them to Bowerbank.
(R. 246)
The

purchasing

employees

grew

resentful

of

Bowerbank's

continued observations, criticisms, and demands (Tr. 1091, 11161127), and, in an effort to obtain sole control of Western, (Tr.
1126-1129), in February 1984 filed a complaint against Western,
Bowerbank, Bowerbank1s two director sons, and Willard and Keith
Smith, claiming Bowerbank would not permit Plaintiffs to control
the affairs of Western;

that certificates showing more shares of

preferred stock had been delivered to them than the corporation
had issued to Bowerbank; that such certificates were ultra vires
or watered stock and that an accounting was necessary.

An order

was sought compelling Bowerbank to deposit his common stock with
the clerk of the court. (R. 2-11)
Course Of Proceedings
By amended complaint, the purchasing employees claimed that
Smiths and Bowerbank's director sons had fraudulently diverted
Western's assets; permitted Kim Bowerbank to purchase a Western
vehicle for less than its value; had Western provide insurance
for the automobile after it was sold; had Western sell a Western
vehicle

to Jonathan

Bowerbank

for

less than its value; had

Western provide insurance and repairs for the automobile after it
was

sold; had

Bowerbank;

Western

paid

Willard

provide health
L.

Smith

insurance

$2,000.00

to Jonathan

per

year,

Kim

Bowerbank and Jonathan Bowerbank $1,000.00 per year, and Keith
Smith

$500.00

services;

that

per

year

Willard

as
Smith

director

fees

and Bowerbank
5

without
changed

receiving
a stock

purchase payment due date causing Western to pay $14,402.00 to
Bowerbank

a

year

early;

that

the

January

1982

consulting

agreement was kept secret from the purchasing employees; that
Bowerbank provided

no consulting

services for his consulting

fees; that Bowerbank directly and through directors Smith and
Bowerbank1s

sons

had

excluded

the purchasing

employees

from

managing Western; that certificates for 171,712 preferred shares
had

been

delivered

to

Plaintiffs,

and

claimed

directors

Bowerbank and Smith had conspired to issued watered stock. (R.
40)
The answer to Plaintiff's amended complaint filed by counsel
(Watkiss and Campbell) for the three Bowerbank defendants was
also filed on behalf of Western. (R. 66)
Smiths

separately

answered,

and

by

counterclaim

and

crossclaim asserted their defenses and sought recovery of their
defense

expenses

and

time

against

the

purchasing

employee

Plaintiffs and also against Western. (R. 84, R.89)
On

September

19, 1984 Western

adopted

a resolution by

majority vote (the two Plaintiff directors voting against it)
stating that Defendant officer/directors acted in good faith and
in the best interests of Western with respect to the matters
alleged

in

authorized

the purchasing
indemnification

employees
of

amended

Defendant

complaint which
officer/directors

against attorney's fees, costs and expenses.

(Ex. 1 p. 635-

637).
In

November

1985,

Plaintiffs

filed

a

second

amended

complaint alleging a number of Western checks were improperly
paid

to Bowerbank, claiming Willard

L. Smith conspired with

Bowerbank to set the price for Bowerbank's land and building
above market value and asserting the contract price should be

reduced or else judgment should be entered against Willard L.
Smith personally for $155,000. (R. 217)
In the pre-trial order (R. 230) the purchasing employees
claimed Defendant Willard L. Smith, Bowerbank and an attorney had
represented that Plaintiffs would be purchasing 200,000 shares of
preferred stock for $1.00 per share and 100,000 shares of common
stock; that the purchasing employees should have an accounting of
all

payments

made

to

Bowerbank

under

the

1977

agreements; that some payments had been doubled

and

1982

requiring a

recomputation of interest; that Bowerbank or Willard L. Smith
should contribute additional capital to Western at the rate of
$1.00 per share for 300,000 shares (R. 248); that the land and
building price should be reduced; that the consulting agreement
should be rescinded; and that Directors Smith and Bowerbank's
sons functioned as Bowerbank's alter egos and had breached their
fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs in various respects and had not
earned their directors fees. (R. 230-237)
In the pre-trial order, Smiths asserted their defenses and
claimed entitlement to defense costs and attorney's fees and
reasonable

charges

for

their

professional

time

consumed

in

preparing accounting summaries and doing other work defending
the litigation, and Western adopted, by reference, all of the
claims and defenses of Smiths and Bowerbank.

(R. 242-43)

Western did not oppose Smiths' indemnification claim against
Western for Smiths' costs, attorney's fees and their professional
time consumed in defending the litigation. (R. 243-244)
Initial Disposition In Court Below
And Subsequent Proceedings
Trial commenced before the Honorable Dean E. Conder December
10, 1985 and continued on December 11 and 13, 1985 and January 8,
1986.

Before the purchasing employees concluded presentation of

their evidence, Trial Judge Dean E. Conder strongly suggested to
the purchasing employees and Bowerbank that a settlement should
be made. (Tr. 1181-82)
With
employee

that

impetus,

Plaintiffs,

Bowerbank's

Bowerbank

with

two director

the

and

the

acquiescence

sons, worked

five
of

purchasing

Western

and

out a settlement with

Bowerbank on January 9, 1985. (Tr. 1198-1211; R. 391-402)
The purchasing employees withdrew and abandoned all claims,
including those made against Smiths. (R. 398)

The settlement

contemplated the purchasing employees would vote in directors
when they received Western's common stock. (Tr. 1208)
No agreement was made with Smiths as to their claim for
costs,

attorney's

fees

and

reasonable

charges

for

their

professional time and extensive accounting services in defending
the litigation.

It was stipulated that the court would determine

those matters based on the evidence heard to that point and upon
proffers

of

evidence

and

memoranda

to be

submitted

by

the

purchasing employees and Smiths. (R. 410-413)
Proffers

of

additional

evidence

concerning

Smiths'

indemnification claims were made. (Tr. 1183-1194)
Supplemental

affidavits

and

memorandums

on

the

indemnification and related issues were submitted. (R. 417-510)
The court granted Smiths judgment against Western only. (R.
501, 530-531)
Control of Western passed to Plaintiffs by reason of the
settlement.
Plaintiffs'

counsel, now

representing

Western, filed

an

appeal from Smiths' judgment. (R. 533)
By Amended Memorandum Decision filed May 9, 1988, this Court
determined the Trial Court's Findings inadequate and remanded the
8

case for such further proceedings and reassessment of the award
as should be appropriate in view of its' comments and for the
entry of suitable findings. (R. 1265-69)
Following

remand, Smiths responded

to a motion made by

Western for release of a supersedeas bond substitute (R. 1255;
1258-1301) and responded to written discovery requests made by
Western. (R. 1660-1752)
Smiths

annexed

As part of Smiths' written responses

comprehensive

defense

services.

written

evidence

summaries

of

their

(R. 1696-1708; 1742-52)
was

submitted

by

litigation

Additional

Smiths

by

means

sworn
of

an

Affidavit of Keith C. Smith (R. 1385-1481) and an Affidavit of
David

S.

Smiths1

Cook,

counsel.

(R.

1371-84)

Additional

memoranda were submitted by Smiths (R. 1482-1505; 1506-09) and an
evidentiary hearing was held (R. 1514) at which Smiths and others
gave

testimony

stipulated

(Tr.

that

the

1756: p.
Smith

1-164)

and

and

Cook

at

which

Affidavits

and

it was
Smiths

Interrogatory Answers would be considered as evidence the same as
though the witnesses had so testified. (Tr. 1756: p. 104-06, 123,
140-42)
The Trial Court ruled on several motions (R. 1631), wrote
three

Memorandum

Decisions

(R.

1516-19;

1630-31;

1639-40)

determining what adjusted indemnification awards would be made,
and amended and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
(R. 1600-28) and an Amended Judgment (R. 1651-54) granting Smiths
indemnification
Smiths

against

Western

indemnification

for

for

defense

their

costs,

costs

of

denying
seeking

indemnification. (R. 1630)
Willard L. Smith was awarded $6,835.89 plus 10% interest
from January 1, 1986.

Keith C. Smith was awarded $8,470.00 plus

10% interest from July 8, 1986.
9

Smiths were awarded $20,127.07

attorney's fees and costs plus 10% interest from January 8, 1986.
(R. 1651-54)
The Trial Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Amended Judgment are Addendums II and III hereto.
Western appealed from the Amended Judgment granted Smiths.
Smiths appealed the denial of Smiths' expense of seeking
indemnification.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Trial Court found the suit was brought against Smiths,
independent CPA's, in their capacities as officer/directors of
Western;

the

basic

historical

facts

concerning

Smiths

past

relationships to and services for Western and the basic facts
pertaining to the contracts which provided for acquisition of
the business by the purchasing employees. (R. 1602-06)
The Trial Court found the facts respecting the 40-odd claims
asserted

against Smiths

in the complaint, amended complaint,

second amended complaint, pre-trial order and during the course
of

the

trial

(R.

1604, 1606-09);

found

that

the

relevancy

asserted by Plaintiff's counsel as to the course of his lengthy
trial examination

of Bowerbank

and Willard L. Smith was to

determine whether Smith had breached his fiduciary duties to
Plaintiffs

(R. 1609); and found that substantial professional

accounting service-type time was required of Smiths prior to and
during

the

trial

researching,

furnishing

and

explaining

accounting data related to various transactions and in connecting
payments questioned by Plaintiff's counsel to the contracts. (R.
609-10)
The

Court

found

that

virtually

all

financial

evidence

produce at trial was originally prepared and located by Smiths;
that payments to Bowerbank were summarized by Smiths, and that
10

Smiths summarized and categorized the funds flowing from Western
to and for the benefit of the purchasing employees. (R. 1610)
The Court found Smiths exercised their professional business
judgment independently of Bowerbank in performing as officers and
directors without person gain; that Smiths had adequately proved
their

claims

for

indemnification

for

professional

accounting

service time in preparing and presenting their defense and for
their defense attorney's fees and costs; and that Smiths' time
summary evidence showed their professional time for which claim
was

made

services

was

not

charged

to Western

and was reasonably

expended

as regular

accounting

in providing accounting

explanations, data and factual accounting-type evidence necessary
to Smiths' defense. (R. 1615-17)
The Court found that Smiths' use of their own professional
time to provide accounting data, summaries and exhibits in their
own defense was more efficient and less costly than would have
been the case had an outside CPA been hired because of Smiths
familiarity with the records and transactions Plaintiffs put in
issue

(R.

1616);

and

that

Smiths

accounting

explanations,

accounting data and exhibits were necessary to Western's defense
as well as to Smiths' personal defense and should be paid by
Western in all events, but that such multiple usefulness did not
take the actual economic expense to Smiths of preparing such out
of the scope of the indemnification statute. (R. 1617)
The Court found Western had adopted all the positions and
defenses

of

Smiths

and

did

not

oppose

Smiths'

claims

for

indemnification with respect to Smiths' professional defense time
taken by the litigation and Smiths' attorney's fees. (R. 1608)
The court found Western had authorized indemnification of
the four defendant directors, including Smiths, as to attorney's

fees, costs and expenses. (R. 1617)
The Court found Smiths had acted in good faith and in a
manner which they reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed to
the

best

interests

of

Western;

that

neither

of

the Smiths

diverted corporate assets or opportunities, competed with Western
or engaged in self dealing or obtained any secret profits; that
Smiths1

defense evidence was credible and refuted the claims

asserted by Plaintiffs and adequately explained and correlated
accounting

data

Plaintiffs;
professionalism
directors

of

and

checks

paid

that

Smiths 1

and

adherence

Western

to Bowerbank

evidence
to

despite

their

questioned

illustrated
duties

considerable

by

their

as officers/
management

difficulties; that Smiths' efforts kept Western solvent, growing
and properly

operating; and that independent proper business

decisions were made despite the friction and lack of effective
communication between the purchasing employees and Bowerbank.
The court found Smiths were, in effect, successful on the
merits or otherwise

in defending against Plaintiffs1

charges

because all claims against Smiths were dropped by Plaintiffs at
the point of the mid-trial settlement and that such fact required
Western to indemnify Smiths pursuant to Section 16-10-4(o)(3) UCA
(1953) - now Section 16-10-4(2)(c) UCA (1953). (R. 1618-19)
The Court found 194.5 hours of professional services were
reasonably and necessarily expended by Willard L. Smith in his
own and Western!s defense.
figure by

deducting

The Court arrived at the 194.5 hour

5.9 hours from Willard L. Smiths

time

summary (R. 1696-1708) which were expended copying documents and
doing work for Bowerbank. (R. 1619-20)
time

expended

by

Willard

L.

Smith

The Court allowed the
in

summarizing

his

indemnifiable expense as reasonable indemnifiable expense. (R.
12

1620)
The Court found 242 hours of professional services were
reasonably and necessarily expended by Keith C. Smith in his own
and Western's defense. (R. 1620)

The Court arrived at the 242

hour figure by deducting 28.2 hours from Keith C. Smith's time
summary. (R. 1742-51)

The Court found 4.2 hours benefited only

Bowerbank and that 24 hours Keith C. Smith spent in court was
necessarily

expended

since Willard L. Smith was present and

testified on behalf of Smiths and Western. (R. 1620)

The Court

included in the allowed 242 hours the time expended by Keith C.
Smith in summarizing indemnifiable expense as also reasonable
indemnifiable expense. (R. 1620)
The Court allowed Smiths only $35.00 per hour, the average
effective hourly rate the Court found Smiths had charged Western
for

regular

accounting

services

rendered

in

1984

and 1985,

disallowing the hourly rate enhancement resulting from Smiths'
"flat rate" billing practice. (R. 1620-21)
rate

enhancement

arising

from

Smiths'

The Court found the
"flat

rate"

billing

practice (which resulting in an actual hourly return to Smiths of
$51.86 per hour for normal accounting services) together with the
savings to Western in not incurring the cost of paying other
CPA's whom Smiths could have supervised, whose rates would have
been much higher than $35.00 or $52.00

($100.00 was Smiths'

evidence) adequately reflected and took into consideration the
value of the time Smiths would have expended in supervising
another CPA to do Smiths/Western's accounting defense work that
Smiths performed, which time the Memorandum Decision of the Court
of Appeals suggested should not be considered recoverable expense
under the indemnification statute. (R. 1622)
The

Court

found

Smiths

had
13

actually,

reasonably

and

necessarily

incurred

attorney's

fees

and

costs

for

Smiths'

defense (R. 1622); that Smiths counsel agreed to render legal
services for just and fair rates; that Smiths had agreed to pay
fair and reasonable legal rates; that evidence was submitted that
$100.00 per hour was a just, fair and reasonable rate, consisting
of proffered testimony of attorney Stephen Henriod, the opinion
testimony of Smiths1 counsel, the oral concession of Western's
counsel that $100.00 per hour was what he normally charges, and
upon evidence suggesting $100.00 per hour was charged Western by
its separate counsel, Bert Dart. (R. 1623)

The Court found

$100.00 per

considering

hour

to be fair and reasonable

the

complexity of the factual and legal issues, the changing nature
of the claims made, the difficult course the case had followed,
the rates customarily charged for similar services and found that
the legal defense work performed was reasonably necessary to
adequately represent Smiths. (R. 1623-24)
The Court found that 176.75 hours of legal services were
necessarily

expended

respecting

Smiths'

defense

from

the

commencement of the case through January 6, 1986 and that an
additional 22 hours of legal services of a defensive nature were
rendered on January 7th and 8th 1986, for a total of 198.75 hours
for defense services for which the Court allowed $100.00 per hour
- $19,875.00

together

with

reasonable

out-of-pocket

expenses

customarily added to legal fees to that point of $252.07, making
a

total

indemnification

award

for

legal defense

expense of

$20,127.07. (R. 1624)
The

Court

allowed

Smiths

pre-judgment

interest

on

the

indemnification awarded. (R. 1626, 1639-40, 1654)
The Court refused to require Western to indemnify Smiths for
the legal expense they incurred in seeking indemnification. (R.
14

1624-26; 1630).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Western

indemnification

use

agreement

Smiths1

of

preclude

defense

Western

services

from

denying

and
its

responsibility to Smiths on appeal.
2.

Western's

insufficiency

of

failure

the

evidence

to

marshal

supporting

and
the

demonstrate

trial

court's

indemnity awards requires award affirmance.
3.

Sufficient evidence supports the awards for Smiths'

professional accounting defense services which benefited both
Western and Smiths.

The $35.00 per hour rate allowed Smiths is

supported by the evidence which fully justified a rate of $100.00
per hour.

The low rate adequately takes into consideration

deemed non-indemnifiable supervisory time.
4.

The

statute

fully

broad

remedial purpose

justifies

treating

of

Smiths'

the

indemnification

expert

defense services time as indemnifiable expense.

accounting

The purpose of

the statute is to encourage qualified persons to assume corporate
stewardship positions by removing the threat of serious economic
harm

from

litigation.

Smiths

were

contractually

appointed

"balancing" officer/directors installed to insure performance of
a de facto trust, and not regular full-time paid employees of
Western, but independent CPA's dependent on their regular CPA
practice for a livelihood.
or otherwise.

Smiths were successful on the merits

Smiths provided expert defense accounting services

more efficiently than could outside supervised accountants.
5. Western must pay for Smiths' accounting defense services
in any event because Smiths served Western's defense needs as
experts, finding, producing and explaining accounting evidence
essential to the proper presentation of Western's defense and
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acted

as

de

facto

trustees

for

both

purchasing

employee

Plaintiffs and for stock seller Bowerbank in accomplishing the
purposes of what was in substance and effect a trust, and as de
facto trustees demonstrated they acted properly in performing
their

trust

duties.

Western

received

benefit

from Smiths1

services which it appreciated, knew of and for which it promised
payment.

It would be unjust for Western to retain the benefit

conferred without payment.
6.

Western's

authorization

of payment of

indemnity to

Smiths for their legal expense precludes Western from denying
responsibility to Smiths on appeal.
7.

Smiths had to be defended to the point of the mid-trial

settlement.

The lower court's denial of legal expense time

expended January 9, 1986 adequately offsets the obviously limited
legal defense time expended in stating Smith's indemnification
claims

in

the

pleadings.

The

evidence

fully

supports

the

$100.00 per hour rate allowed.
8.

Smiths were properly allowed pre-judgment interest on

awards based on fixed rules of evidence in accordance with known
standards of value respecting professional accounting and legal
services.
9.

Smiths'

legal

expense

incurred

in connection with

enforcing their statutory right of mandatory indemnification is
itself

indemnifiable

expense

under

a

interpretation of the indemnification statute.
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proper

liberal

ARGUMENT
POINT I
WAIVER, ESTOPPEL AND THE PRINCIPLE THAT CLAIMS AND
DEFENSES NOT RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED ON APPEAL PRECLUDE WESTERN FROM DENYING
ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO PAY SMITHS THE REASONABLE VALUE
OF THEIR PROFESSIONAL TIME AND SERVICES DEFENDING
SMITHS AND WESTERN AGAINST PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
Western urges this Court to reverse the indemnification the
Trial Court awarded Smiths and award them nothing. (Western Brief
p. 6-8)
Western's position in the Trial Court (and for a time after
the mid-trial settlement that led to control of Western shifting
to Plaintiffs and their counsel) was the opposite. (R. 1608)
Western did not oppose Smiths indemnification claims against
Western at trial, nor by initial post-trial proffer or memoranda.
(See R. 243-44 of the Pre-Trial Order statement of Western's
position;

Tr.

1183-1194

proffers

made

after

the

mid-trial

settlement; and R. 492 and 517 consisting of memorandums filed on
behalf

of

Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs.

No

which

initial

resisted

opposition

Smiths'
memoranda

claims
was

against
filed

by

Western.)
Seven months into the case Western adopted a resolution
authorizing

indemnification

of

all

four

defendant

directors

against attorney's fees, costs and expenses in essentially the
language

of

paragraph

5

of

Section

16-10-4(o)

UCA

(1953).

(Exhibit 1 p. 635-637)
Having authorized and promised indemnification and having
used Smiths' defense services rather than getting and paying
outside

CPA's

for

defensive

principles of waiver

accounting

services, elementary

and estoppel preclude Western from now

claiming it has no responsibility to pay twice court-ordered
indemnification

for

the

modest
17

reasonable

value

of

Smiths'

professional services in Western's (and Smiths1) defense.
Smiths justifiably relied on Western's acts, admissions,
representations and silence in rendering defense services and
will suffer injury if Western is allowed to repudiate its prior
conduct on appeal*

B.R. Woodward Marketing v. Collins Food, 754

P.2d 99 (Utah App. 1988); Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 754
P.2d 1222 (Utah 1988); Larson v. Wycoff Co., 624 P.2d 1151 (Utah
1981); and Arrowhead Constr. Co. v. Essex Corp., 662 P.2d 1195
(Kan. 1983).
Issues, defenses and factual claims not presented at trial
cannot be considered on appeal.

Interlake Co. v. Von Hake, 697

P.2d 238 (Utah 1985); Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372 (Utah
1984); Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilken, 668 P.2d 493 (Utah
1983); Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983); Yost v.
State, 640 P2d 1044 (Utah 1981); Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601
(Utah 1978); and Meyer v. Deluke, 457 P.2d 966 (Utah 1969).
Subsection

(3) of the indemnification statute, mandatory

indemnification, was

enacted

primarily

to protect

vindicated

officers and directors from a refusal to indemnify when, as here,
an

adverse

shift

in management

has

occurred.

See Western

Fiberglass v. Kirton McConkie and Bushnell, 789 P.2d 34, 37 (Utah
App. 1990).
POINT II
WESTERN'S FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING
THE TRIAL COURT'S INDEMNITY AWARDS TO SMITHS FOR THEIR
PROFESSIONAL DEFENSE WORK AND FAILURE TO DEMONSTRATE
INSUFFICIENCY THEREOF REQUIRES AFFIRMANCE OF THE AWARDS
Western's attack on the Trial Court's indemnity awards to
Smiths for their professional defense services (Western's Brief,
Argument I) ignores the Trial Court's specific findings that
Smiths' work and efforts defended not only Smiths but Western as
well (R. 1617); the fact Western used and benefited from Smiths'
1R

less

costly

than

outside

CPA

defense

services

(R.

Western's agreement to indemnify Smiths (R. 1617-18);

1616);
and the

evidence supporting the modest awards made.
Western's brief makes no efforts to marshal the supporting
evidence nor to demonstrate insufficiency thereof to support the
awards as is required of appellants attacking findings of fact.
Williams v. Miller, 794 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah App. 1990); Doelle v.
Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178-79 (Utah 1989) and Grayson Roper
Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989).
The

Trial

Court's

indemnity

awards

services should therefore not be disturbed.

for

Smith's defense

Scharf v. BMG Corp.,

700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985).
POINT III
THE INDEMNITY AWARDS FOR SMITHS1 PROFESSIONAL DEFENSE WORK
IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE
Western's attack on the awards made for Smiths' professional
defense
Trial

services

Court's

(Western's Brief

Findings

of

- Argument I) ignores the

Fact, ignores

the evidence which

supports the Findings, distorts the prior remand decision of this
Court and what the lower court did and falsely implies Smiths are
seeking double payment.
Western's current attack is as lacking in credibility as
were Plaintiffs' 40-odd accusations against Smiths, Western (and
Bowerbank) in the lower court proceedings.
Western

charges

the

Trial

Court with having

ignored a

command of this Court to scrutinize and distinguish the types of
work for which Smiths sought compensation and asks this Court to
totally deny compensation for Smiths' defense services.
The May 9, 1988 Amended Memorandum Decision of this Court
said this Court could not determine whether the first awards made
by the Trial Court were reasonable and that the basis of the
1Q

awards was unstated in the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision and
Findings of Fact.

In the "Considerations On Remand" portion of

the Memorandum Decision, this Court said as to Smiths' services,
the Trial Court should:

(a) endeavor to distinguish between the

types of work for which Smiths sought recover; (b) clarify the
issues; and (c) specifically address Western's claim Smiths had
billed

Western

only

$13.00

to

$15.00

per

hour

for

normal

accounting services while claiming $40.00 and $60.00 per hour for
litigation services. (R. 1265-69)
After remand, the Trial Court made three more memorandum
decisions (R. 1516-19, 1630-31, 1639-40) and 62 detailed separate
findings of fact. (R. 1600-29)
As to the matter of distinguishing between the types of
Smiths' defense work and placing the same in the various possible
theoretical

categories

suggested

by

the

Amended

Memorandum

Decision, long after the services were rendered, the first point
Smiths make is that these categories did not suggest themselves
to Smiths as necessary characterizations/categorizations of their
work as they went along performing services.

Therefore, the best

Smiths could do after the Amended Memorandum Decision suggested
categorization was necessary was to review again their time
records in the form they were kept, which had been summarized for
the Trial Court before and to endeavor to add such clarifications
and amplifications as was then practicable and so they did. (R.
1660-1752)
The second point Smiths make is that in truth and reality
Smiths were Western, spoke for Western, acted for Western, and
explained for Western as well as themselves as far as defense of
the suit was concerned.

The Trial Court so found. (R. 1617)

Western was a closely held corporation.
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Defendant Bowerbank

was the selling stockholder of Western's stock.
the right of control and the business.

He was selling

Plaintiffs were buying

the stock, the business and the right of control.
contractually

Smiths were

appointed officers/directors whose expertise was

needed to see Bowerbank got his money from Western's operations
paid on behalf of Plaintiffs and that Plaintiffs' maintained a
profitable

operation,

control

of

which

would

pass

when

Bowerbank's ownership interest was paid for in full.
In every sense of the word Smiths functioned as Trustees,
with duties to Plaintiffs and to Bowerbank.

Plaintiffs and

Bowerbank "were Western" from a real world economic ownership of
a business standpoint.

The fact the one man to become a five-man

business was in corporate form was basically happenstance.
Trial

Court,

a

seasoned

lawyer

with

substantial

The

practical

experience in the legal and business world, (see Tr. 1181-82),
understood that.
Plaintiffs' frustrations in dealing with Bowerbank during
performance of the contracts lead them to file suit attacking not
only Bowerbank but also Smiths and virtually everything that had
gone on from the inception of the contracts to events just before
trial.
Unanticipated,

unprovided

for

vast

amounts

of

Smiths'

professional CPA time was taken in explaining, summarizing and
showing the contracts were fair, claimed wrongful payments were
contract

justified

and

the like.

Simple

justice under any

theory, indemnification being the most obvious, required Western
to bear the reasonable cost of Smiths' work.
Is that not the object of the legal system - delivery of
simple justice rather than the fostering of artificial unhelpful
complexity?
91

Under all the circumstances of this rather unusual fact
pattern, the Trial Court saw fit to deny Smiths' compensation for
only the portion of their time which appeared to the Trial Court
to help only Bowerbank or to be unnecessary duplicate effort (R.
1619-20), viewing the balance as necessary accounting defense
work equally necessary to the defense of Western and Smiths.
Competent,
Court's

detailed

finding

that

evidence

Willard

L.

fully
Smith

supports

the

necessarily

Trial

expended

194.95 hours in his/Western's defense (R. 1619) and that Keith C.
Smith

reasonably

his/Western's

and

defense.

necessarily

expended

(R.

(See

1620)

evidence, Tr. 1183-91; Smiths' Affidavits
1385-1481)

Exhibits

D-67

and

D-68;

242

Smiths'

hours

in

proffer

of

(R. 470-80; 481-91;

Smiths'

Expanded

Time

Summaries (R. 1696-1708; 1742-52); Smiths' testimony (Tr. 1756,
p.

4-16, 27-29, 39-62, 73-78, 87, 102, 111-112, 145-48) and

Smiths' sworn written Answers to Interrogatories (R. 1660-1708,
1709-1754).
There is no basis at all in the uncontradicted evidence
which describes the time and services performed by Smiths for
which the Trial Court allowed compensation, for concluding the
Trial

Court

finding
related

was

Smith's

manifestly

wrong

work

compensable

defense

as

services.

in

viewing/characterizing/
accounting/accounting

Claims,

charges

mischaracterizations had to be answered and explained.

and

It takes

time to dig out, distinguish, evaluate, explain and furnish data
and to prepare defensive testimony and exhibits.

Smiths' work

for which they sought and received compensation was of that
nature.

Smiths made no claim for approximately 65 hours time

taken in reviewing new claims, organizing time summary data and
reviewing suit documents. (Tr. 1756, p. 10)
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The
regular

first

assertion by

accounting

service

Plaintiffs' counsel

billing

rate was

that Smiths

only

$13.00 or

$15.00 per hour was made after Smiths' proffered their evidence
supporting

their

indemnification

claims

after

the

mid-trial

settlement (Tr. 1192), after the trial closed and at a point when
the expectation was proffers and submission of memoranda would be
sufficient

to

enable

indemnification.

the

court

to

award

appropriate

(See Tr. 1183-1193)

It is common knowledge that office overhead alone is much
more than $13.00 or $15.00 per hour and that professional CPA's
charge

$100.00

per

hour

and

up,

especially

for

litigation

support services, so the inference Smiths should only get $13.00
or $15.00 per hour for complex litigation defense accounting work
and not even the modest $40.00 and $60.00 they were asking
collapsed inherently, lacking credibility.
Nonetheless,

since

this

Court

said

there

should

be

a

specific finding as to Western's $13.00 - $15.00 contention, the
Trial

Court

findings

specifically

addressed

this

matter

in

its

new

(R. 1620), which are not only supported but indeed

compelled by Keith Smiths' detailed written analysis/explanation
of Smiths' regular 1984 and 1985 accounting work billings to
Western, which appears in his Affidavit and Exhibits thereto
dated March 27, 1989

(R. 1385-1481) which he also explained

orally. (Tr. 1756, p. 15-16)
Smiths' analysis showed the average earned hourly rate for
Smiths'

professional

CPA

time

involved

in

Smiths'

regular

accounting services to be $34.75 per hour in 1984 and $34.39 per
hour in 1985 which the Court decided justified limiting Smiths to
$35.00

per

services.

hour

for

their

professional

litigation

defense

Smiths' evidence

further

showed

that Smiths time- worth

billing method applied to regular 1984-85 services for Western
resulted

in

average

involved

of

$51.86

actual
per

real

hour.

earnings

(R.

for

1387)

the

CPA time

Smiths'

own

and

independent expert evidence was that $40.00 per hour for Keith
Smiths time was minimally fair and $60.00 per hour for Willard
Smiths

time

was

minimally

fair

and

that

from

an objective

standpoint Smiths should be compensated at $100.00 per hour. (R.
1288; Tr. 1756, p. 77-78, 147-148)
Western

produced

no

evidence

to

rebut

Smiths'

expert

witness evidence that $100.00, or at least $40.00 (Keith Smith)
or $60.00

(Willard Smith) per hour was objectively fair and

reasonable.
Clearly Smiths, rather than Western, are the parties injured
by the extremely low rate allowed by the Trial Court.
A

comment

suggests

in

that had

this

Court's

Amended

Memorandum

Smiths hired qualified

Decision

experts to do the

necessary defense accounting work and merely supervised them,
Western could have avoided paying Smiths for their supervisory
work.

That proposition seems questionable in the context of this

case where Smiths were not full-time employee officers/directors
of Western, but CPA's with independent practices, serving as
contractually

appointed

officers/directors,

essentially

as

a

courtesy, for only token compensation.
Nonetheless,

the

Trial

Court

effectively

denied

Smiths

compensation for the equivalent of deemed supervisory time in
finding the difference between Smiths flat-rate billing method,
which resulted in an actual hourly return to Smiths of $51.86 per
hour, and the allowed $35.00 per hour, together with the savings
to Western of not having to pay other CPA's whom Smiths could
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have supervised, whose rates would have been much higher than
$35.00 or $52.00 per hour (probably $100.00 per hour) adequately
reflected and took into consideration the value of the time
Smiths would have expended supervising others who might have been
hired to do accounting defense work. (R. 1621-22)
Western's Brief infers Smiths billed and were paid for all
of their time, implying Smiths are seeking to double charge.
Western's

brief

ignores

the Trial

Court's

specific

contrary

finding (R. 1617) and its uncontradicted supporting evidence. (R.
471, 482; Tr. 1184; Tr. 1756, p.49, 68)
Western shows no lack of evidentiary support for the Trial
Court's modest indemnity awards for Smiths professional defense
work.

The awards are supported by abundant detailed evidence and

must be affirmed.

Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989).
POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURTfS CHARACTERIZATION OF SMITHS1 PROFESSIONAL
TIME SPENT IN THEIR DEFENSE AS INDEMNIFICATION EXPENSE UNDER
SECTION 16-10-4(o)(3) UCA (1953) NOW SECTION 16-10-4(2)(c)
IS A PROPER APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE IN ACCORD WITH ITS PURPOSE
The findings set forth the nature, scope and numerosity of
Plaintiffs' claims against Smiths and Western (R. 1604, 1606-09),
which

included

Plaintiffs

a

claim

to contribute

Willard
$300,000

L.

Smith

was

obligated

to

in additional capital. (R.

1607)
The
services

court
were

found

required

substantial
prior

to

and

professional
at

trial

accounting
researching,

furnishing and explaining accounting data relating to various
challenged transactions and connecting questioned payments to the
contracts

(R.

1610);

that

virtually

all

financial

evidence

produced at trial was originally prepared and located by Smiths;
that Smiths had summarized all payments to Bowerbank and all
payments made to the Plaintiffs (R. 1610); that Smiths were not
25

Bowerbank's

alter

egos

but

had

exercised

independent

professional judgment as officers and directors (R. 1615); that
Smiths had proved their claims for indemnification (R. 1615); and
that

Smiths

accounting

use

of

data,

their

own

summaries

and

professional
exhibits

in

time

to provide

their

own

(and

Western's) defense was more efficient and less costly than would
have been the case had an outside CPA been hired because of
Smiths' familiarity with Western's records and the transactions
Plaintiffs put in issue. (R. 1616)
The

Court

accounting

found

data

and

that

Smiths'

accounting

accounting

exhibits

explanations,

were

necessary

to

Western's defense as well as to Smiths' personal defense and
should be paid by Western in all events, but that such multiple
usefulness of the data did not take the actual economic expense
to

Smiths

of

preparing

such

out

of

the

scope

of

the

indemnification statute. (R. 1617)
The
liberally

Court

found

and

broadly

the

indemnification

interpreted

in

statute

light

of

should

its

be

intended

remedial purpose to encourage competent independent professional
people, including CPA's, to serve as directors of corporations by
removing the risk they will have to defend burdensome litigation
at their own expense. (R. 1617)
The

Court

found

Western

adopted

an

indemnification

resolution after the suit was filed authorizing indemnification
of the four defendant directors, which stated all had acted in
good faith and in the best interests of Western in respect to the
matters alleged in Plaintiffs' amended complaint (R. 1618); that
Smiths had in fact acted in good faith and in the manner which
they reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed to, the best
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interests of Western (R. 1618); that Smiths were, in substance
and effect, successful on the merits or otherwise in defending
against Plaintiffs' charges (R. 1618); and such required Western
to indemnify Smiths pursuant to Section 16-10-4(o)(3) UCA (1953)
now Section 16-10-4(2)(c) UCA. (R. 1619)
Section 16-4-10(o)(3) provides:
(3) To the extent that a director, officer,
employee or agent of a corporation has been successful
on the merits or otherwise in defense of any action,
suit or proceeding referred to in (1) or (2) of this
subsection, or in defense of any claim, issue or matter
therein, he shall be indemnified against expenses
(including attorneys' fees) actually and reasonably
incurred by him in connection therewith.
Termination

of

claims

by

agreement

without

payment

or

assumption of liability is "success on the merits or otherwise"
under

the

indemnification

International,

583

F.2d

statute.
579

(2d

Wisener
Cir.

1987)

v. Air Express
(applying

the

Illinois indemnification statute - substantively the same as the
Utah statute).
The

results

sought by

Smiths, dismissal

of Plaintiffs'

claims, was achieved when the purchasing employees abandoned all
claims against Smiths.

Smiths were thus "successful on the

merits or otherwise" in their defense within the meaning of
subparagraph 3 of Section 16-10-4(o), Utah Code Annotated (1953).
The "prevailing party" for purposes of an award of fees is
the "successful party".

The "successful" party is the one who

obtains the result sought, even if by consent, in a suit in which
no

judgment

is

entered.

See

City

Electric

v.

Industrial

Indemnity Co., 683 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1984).
Western argues the term "expenses" in the indemnification
statute should be narrowly interpreted to preclude payment for
the reasonable value of professional accounting defense services
used in defending against serious charges instead of being put to
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productive use and that only dollar costs paid by check should be
deemed expenses.
issue

is whether

In the context of the facts of this case, the
the legislature intended essentially unpaid

professional

outside

business

contribute

to

CPA

directors

all of

of

their

a

small

incorporated

professional

accounting

service-type time required to prove their innocence and their
good-faith adherence to their fiduciary duties while assisting
both

sides

in a

legal battle

for control of

a financially

successful business.
Three critical facts in this case, which do not often appear
in suits brought against officer/directors are:
First, Smiths had done all of the accounting work for the
corporation, had possession of the facts and could more easily
and efficiently produce and summarize the same for the benefit of
the parties and the court and thus demonstrate the baselessness
of Plaintiffs' claims than could new outside accountants.
Second, Smiths were not full-time employees who were already
being paid with regular salaries by the corporation.
Third, Smiths were contractually appointed officer/directors
to manage the corporation and insure performance of the stock/
business site sale contracts.
If

an

officer

or

director

is

receiving

his

regular

compensation while being sued, the only economic loss he will
suffer is that of attorney's fees and court costs.

It is just as

much an expense to an outside professional person who continues
to accrue office overhead

and

living expenses to contribute

uncompensated time, unbillable to clients in the ordinary course,
as it is to pay out cash for services while remaining employed by
paying clients and thus earning an income.
money.

Professional time is

Contributed/taken professional time is an actual expense
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just the same as money earned by time and paid out is an actual
incurred expense.
defending

the

Smiths' professional service time consumed

litigation

was

very

substantial,

not

merely

incidental - 270.50 hours on the part of Keith C. Smith (R. 470480) and over 200.85 hours on the part of Willard L. Smith (R.
481-490).

This

equates to about three months of full-time

professional work.
Did

the

Legislature

which

adopted

the

indemnification

statute to help attract capable professional management people
intend that officer/directors receiving full-time salaries from
their corporation should be preserved from substantial economic
litigation

loss

officer/directors

for

having

serving

agreed

essentially

to

so

serve,

but

pro bono would

that

not be

preserved from substantial economic litigation loss?

Was it the

Legislature's

time

intent

to

help

attract

only

full

directors but not part time virtually unpaid directors?
Legislature

intend

to

subject

professional

CPA

paid

Did the
directors

providing professional accounting defense services to substantial
economic litigation loss but to preserve directors providing no
such services from litigation loss?
Utah's remedial indemnification statue is to be construed
liberally with a view to effecting its object and promoting
justice.

Utah law on the construction of statutes is set forth

in Section 68-3-2 UCA (1953):
68-3-2.

Statutes in derogation of common law
liberally construed
- Rules of
prevail.

equity

The rule of the common law that statutes in
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no
application to the statutes of this state.
The
statutes establish the laws of this state respecting
the subjects to which they relate, and their provisions
and all proceedings under them are to be liberally
construed with a view to effect the objects of the
statutes and to promote justice. Whenever there is any
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variance between the rules of equity and the rules of
common law in reference to the same matter the rules of
equity shall prevail.
Section 68-3-2 thus specifically and intentionally abrogates
the common law approach to statutory construction in mandatory
terms.

In re Garr's Estate, 86 Pac. 757 (Utah 1906); Hammond v.

Wall, 171 Pac. 148 (Utah 1918).
To deny Smiths indemnity because they did not formally hire
and then write checks to themselves, or to pretend they incurred
no expense by assuming their professional time was worthless to
them would be to utterly ignore the indemnification statute,
defeat its object, and deliberately work severe injustice.
In 1969 Utah amended its indemnification statute to enlarge
indemnification powers.

Utah was among the 26 states which

adopted the comprehensive, broad indemnification provisions of
the model business corporation act, including both enabling and
mandatory provisions.

Much discussion in the literature points

out the desirability of attracting well qualified individuals to
corporate directorships through providing safeguards to increased
exposure to liability.
4 p. 2123 (1976).
consider

See discussion in 31 The Business Lawyer

The liberality with which the Court should

indemnification

subparagraph

(2) of

the

is

reflected

in

the

statute which permits

language

of

court-ordered

indemnification even where the defendant is adjudged liable if,
despite such adjudication in view of all circumstances of the
case, the court determines such person is fairly and reasonably
entitled

to

indemnity

for

such expenses as the court deems

proper.
The operative subparagraph in this case is subparagraph (3).
Because the Smiths were successful they "shall be indemnified
against

expenses

(including

attorney's
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fees)

actually

and

reasonably incurred by (them) in connection therewith".
actually

and

uncompensated
defense.

reasonably

incurred

professional

the

accounting

expense

service

of

time

They

use
in

of

their

The court found Smiths acted in good faith and in a

manner each reasonably believed to be in the best interest of the
corporation.

The statute clearly authorizes and invites the

court to do justice in the particular circumstances of each case.
It is unfair, unjust, unreasonable and unnecessary to require
professional persons, dependent on making charges to the general
public

for

livelihood

professional
for

services,

substantial

to

periods

abandon

of

time

their

regular

to defend

their

actions against unfounded claims without payment for their time
thus

taken.

Such violates

due process of

law and imposes

involuntary servitude.
The term "expenses" is defined neither in the Utah statute
nor has such term been later defined in updated versions of the
model business corporation act.

See Model Business Corporation

Act Annotated, AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, 2d ed. vol. 1 Section 5
(1971).

The very fact said term has been given no limited

definition and the statute uses the phrase "such expenses which
such court shall deem proper" (subparagraph (2) 9f Section 16-104(o)) indicates the court should use reasoned judgment as to
indemnifiable expense with the purpose of the statute in view.
The phrase "actually and reasonably incurred" appears in the
statute.

The Smiths acted reasonably and necessarily.

Smiths'

professional expert services produced the accounting data and
facts

defensively

showing

Western's

affairs

were

in

order,

without which the case could not have proceeded as expeditiously
as it did proceed and without which it probably could not have
been

settled.

Smiths1

accounting
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work

demonstrated

both

Plaintiffs

and

Bowerbank

received

fair

treatment

under

the

contracts and that Western had suffered no loss, indeed had grown
in value.
The key relevant purpose/policy consideration underlying the
indemnification section of the model business corporation act
adopted by Utah and many other states as specifically recognized
by this Court in Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie and
Bushnell, 789 P.2d 34 (Utah App. 1990), and by other courts, see
e.g. Wisener v. Air Express International Corp., 583 F.2d 579
(2d Cir. 1978)

(Illinois statute) and Professional Insurance

Company of N.Y. v. Barry, 303 N.Y.S.2d 556 (S.Ct. 1969) is that
indemnity protection is necessary or desirable to encourage the
recruitment

of

capable

management

executives

and

to

allow

corporation management to assume stewardship responsibilities of
pursuing corporate activities unfettered by fear of taking goodfaith

risks.

valuable

Benefit

executives

to

to

corporations

serve

by

comes

promising

from

inducing

protection

from

unjustified litigation.
Western relies on one lower federal district court opinion,
Phillips v. Investors Diversified Services, Inc., 426 F.Supp. 208
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) which denied a former director the reasonable
value of his services as attorney pro se defending himself in
earlier shareholder derivative litigation.

That decision was a

lower federal district court decision applying its view of New
York law.

No mention is made in the decision as to whether New

York has adopted Utah's standard that statutes in derogation of
the common law are to be liberally, not strictly, construed.

No

mention is made in the opinion of the remedial purpose of the
statute.

The actual dispositive holding of that court was that

Phillips' cause of action was clearly barred by a statute of
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limitations.
not

The additional opinion that pro se services were

indemnifiable

expenses

was

obiter

dicta

totally

out of

harmony with the plain purpose of the indemnification statute and
hardly "prevailing judicial thought" as Western's brief asserts.
Further, the law suit defended was a shareholder derivative
action in the right of the corporation in which the attorney
represented only himself.
Here, Western was a defendant whose own defense interests
Smiths served along with their own.
Western totally fails to justify the narrow, restrictive,
unnecessary, unreasonable, unjust interpretation of the statute
it urges.
The Trial

Court

applied

the

corporation

indemnification

statute to the circumstances of this case respecting Smiths'
accounting defense work in a manner consistent with its language
and purpose as directed by Section 68-3-2 UCA (1953).
POINT V
IN NO EVENT IS WESTERN ENTITLED TO TAKE SMITHS EXPERT
ACCOUNTING DEFENSE SERVICES WITHOUT PAYING FOR THEM
The matters set forth under Points I, II and III above are
incorporated as part of Point V.
The Trial Court specifically found that Smiths1 accounting
explanations,

accounting

data

and

accounting

exhibits

were

necessary to Western's defense as well as to Smiths' personal
defense and should be paid for by Western in all events. (R.
1617)
This Court presumes findings of facts to be correct because
the trial court has the advantage of seeing and hearing the
witnesses testify.
Unless demonstrated to be clearly erroneous, findings of
fact will not be set aside.

If there is a reasonable basis in
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the evidence, a trial court's award for damages will be affirmed
on appeal.

Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1987).

Besides being properly indemnifiable expense of Smiths1 own
defense

under

the

corporation

code, Smiths defense

services

equally benefited and were equally defense services for Western
and should be paid for by Western in all events for at least the
following reasons:
First, Smiths served Western's defense needs as expert CPA
accounting witnesses.

Their expertise was essential for the

development and presentation of the case. When expert accounting
evidence produced by expert CPA's is essential to the proper
presentation of a case, and without which essential facts can
not come to light, it is proper to award the fees of such
experts as allowable court costs.

Highland Construction Co. v.

Union Pacific R. Co., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984);
Wilson, 605 P.2d

771

(Utah 1980), and

cf. Frampton v.

American Timber and

Trading Co. v. Niedermeyer, 276 Or. 1135, 558 P.2d 1211, (Or.
1976).
This case is quite similar to Neese v. Richer, 428 N.E.2d 36
(Ind. 1981) in which the trial court was held to have properly
assessed

the cost of a comprehensive

accounting

against the

corporation along with court costs and attorney's fees since the
accounting was very important in presenting and concluding the
matters in litigation.
Second, Smiths acted as de facto trustees for both the
purchasing employee Plaintiffs and for the seller Bowerbank, in
accomplishing the purposes of what was, in substance and effect,
a trust.

This fact brings this case within the principle that a

trustee required to bear the cost of services for the trust or
required

to demonstrate he acted properly
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in performing his

duties has a lien on trust assets for reimbursement.

Solimine v.

Hollander, 129 N.J.Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (N.J.Eg. 1941).

In

Solimine, directors sought indemnification for expenses incurred
in defending a stockholders1 derivative suit charging directors
with negligence, mismanagement, diversion of funds and fraud and
seeking

an accounting

and damages.

The directors had been

faithful to their trust and satisfactorily explained challenged
transactions.

Since the officers and directors had demonstrated

loyalty and honesty to their trust, they were held entitled to be
reimbursed by the corporate defendant for the costs incurred in
connection with the litigation.

The court held that exposure to

charges of misconduct should not be deemed by the courts a hazard
impliedly assumed by acceptance of office.
The

same

appointed

is

especially

independent

professional

essentially as trustees.
it

is

sought

mismanagement

to
or

true

charge

respecting

contractually

officers/directors

serving

In Solimine, the court said that when
a

trustee with

claimed negligence,

fraud, or where his removal is sought for

claimed misconduct and the trustee prevails, the expenses of his
resistance are paid out of the trust estate and without inquiry
as to the question of whether or not his defense benefited the
trust.
effect,

By defending the action, the executor or trustee is, in
sustaining

the

testator's

intent

the

administered by the hands into which it was confided.

estate

be

A trustee

charged with misconduct equally with a director charged with
misconduct owes a duty to stand his ground against unjust attack
to demonstrate the honesty of his management.

Public policy

dictates that directors, like executors and trustees, should be
encouraged

to

resist

unjust

charges

in the confidence

that

ultimately their innocence will be established and they will be
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reimbursed for the expenses of defense.

Otherwise, responsible

businessmen

accept

will

be

disinclined

to

directorships,

especially when the emoluments of office are not commensurate
with the risk of loss involved.
of reimbursement

Solimine observed that a right

carries the virtue of discouraging strident

stockholder litigation and held that the director's application
for expenses should be made to the court in the original action
as the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the
matter.
The Trial Court correctly applied the principles illustrated
in Solimine to the facts of this case.
Equally instructive is Estate of Gillman, 444 N.Y.S.2d 975
(1981).

Professional services were required in an effort to

stabilize

and

improve

the

management

of

a

corporation owned by disagreeing family factions.

closely

held

A proceeding

was filed to impress a constructive trust upon a widows exercise
of a testamentary power of appointment on the basis such a trust
would equalize and stabilize control of the corporation which had
been profitable but which had commenced to suffer losses which
were finally avoided because of the achievement of an overall
settlement.

The court held the professional services involved

were valuable to the corporation and that the court had full
authority

to require the corporation to pay for them.

The

services included advice necessary to avoid or avert corporation
actions inimical to the business success of the company which
advanced prospects of long-range profitability.
Smiths' services kept Western profitably functioning through
the litigation.
economic

Smiths were not errant directors deserving of

punishment.

They

functioned

essentially

as

contractually installed trustees of a trust which they properly

performed.
Third, all of the elements of a quasi contract, a contract
implied in law, are present:
1. Western received a benefit.
2.

Western,

at

least

throughout

the

trial court

proceeding up to the point where control of Western passed to
Plaintiffs and their counsel, used, appreciated, knew of and
expected to pay for the benefit.
3.

It would be unjust for Western to retain the

benefit without paying for it.

See Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264

(Utah App. 1987).
The measure of recovery under a contract implied in law is
the value of the benefit conferred.

Davies v. Olson, supra.

The Trial Court granted a value of the benefit conferred
recovery based not on the objective reasonable value of the
Smiths' services, but on the lower actual rate of return realized
by Smiths for their normal accounting services as billed in 1984
and 1985. (R. 1620-22)
It

is

Smiths, not Western, that

should be

complaining

because of the Trial Court's refusal to allow all of Smiths' time
and refusal to award the $100.00 per hour rate CPA's specifically
hired for litigation normally charge.
This

Court

should

rectify

that

error

and

allow

Smiths

$100.00 per hour on the basis of the uncontradicted objective
expert evidence $100.00 per hour was an objective and fair rate
for their services. (Tr. 147-48)
There is every reasonable basis in the evidence for the
Trial Court's modest award to Smiths for their defense services,
hence

such

award

must

be

affirmed

Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1987).
0*7

on

appeal.

Gillmor v.

POINT VI
WAIVER, ESTOPPEL, FAILURE TO RAISE DEFENSES IN THE
TRIAL COURT AND FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE
SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S INDEMNITY AWARD TO SMITHS
FOR REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR THEIR DEFENSE AND
FAILURE TO ENDEAVOR TO DEMONSTRATE INSUFFICIENCY
THEREOF REQUIRES AFFIRMANCE OF THE AWARD
All

Smiths1

of

arguments, points

and

supporting

legal

authorities set forth under Points I and II above with respect to
Western's appeal attack on the awards made for Smiths' defense
accounting services are likewise applicable to Western's appeal
attack on the attorney's fee award made to Smiths for legal
services for their defense.

The same are incorporated herein.
POINT VII

THE INDEMNITY AWARDED SMITHS FOR LEGAL SERVICES FOR
THEIR DEFENSE IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE
Western's attack on the indemnification awarded Smith for
the legal expense and costs of their defense ignores the Trial
Court's

findings

of

fact

and

the

detailed

evidence

which

supports them, attempts to distort and mislead as to the clear
record

showing

Smiths

clear

Plaintiff's
to

the

continuous

point

of

everchanging

the mid-trial

attack

settlement

on
and

misstates the evidence.
In the "Considerations On Remand" portion of the Amended
Memorandum
suggested

Decision
that

of

the

this

Trial

Court

Court

of

May

should

9,

have

1988, it was
endeavored

to

differentiate between legal services defending the law suit on
behalf

of

accounting

Smiths
fees.

and

legal

(R. 1268)

services
After

in

collecting

Smiths'

saying that, the Amended

Memorandum Decision of this Court further states that this Court
has

"no insurmountable

reasonably

incurred

in

difficulty with the notion that fees
obtaining

the

very

indemnification

provided by the statute might fairly be characterized as fees 'in
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connection' with the defense for which indemnification is due".
(R. 1268)
Notwithstanding the latter comment, the Trial Court decided
it was

required

to deny recovery

of the considerable

legal

expense Smiths incurred after the mid-trial settlement in seeking
initial and reassessed indemnification.
That result really left Western with nothing at all of
substance

to

complain

mischaracterizing

all

about,

so

Smiths1

of

Western
counsel

has

resorted

services

to

as merely

seeking to collect indemnification and falsely claiming Smiths
failed to prove required differentiation.
Obviously

the

only

legal

service

regarding

seeking

indemnification that was required of Smiths counsel up to the
mid-trial settlement point was to keep that claim stated in the
pleadings and in the pre-trial order.
take?

How much time did that

That time was not separately broken out at the time, but

it obviously takes very little time to state and restate claims.
Defense services aiding Smiths defensively in "succeeding on
the merits

or

otherwise"

indemnification.
merits

or

accurate

also qualified

them

for

statutory

Legal services helping them succeed on the

otherwise
reporting

Plaintiffs' charges

by
of

preparing

to

accounting

prove

facts

the

and proving via
baselessness

of

and Smiths actual adherence to fiduciary

standards was certainly not seeking to collect accounting fees
nor merely seeking indemnification.
automatically

entitled

them

to

Smiths' successful defense

indemnification.

Western's

position amounts to nothing more than the proposition that since
Smiths proved they were entitled to indemnification, they don't
get indemnification.
The

record

keeping

allocation

suggested

by

this

court

certainly did not suggest itself to Smiths1 counsel as necessary
as legal services were being rendered to Smiths.

At no time

during the litigation, or afterwards, did Smiths give accounting
services bills to their counsel for collection.

It was assumed

Western would pay fair indemnification if Smiths were successful
on the merits.

Counsel for Smith recorded all legal services as

they were rendered in the customary manner and recapitulated such
services for the trial court in written form as evidence showing
the legal services rendered to Smiths. (Ex. D-61, also at R. 463469; Tr. 1183)
Smiths' counsel presented his own and Smiths' time summaries
on January 9, 1986. (Ex. D-67 and D-68; Tr. 1183)
The
counsels

Trial

Court

time expended

conferences,

denied

recovery

January

settlement

of

the

13.5 hours of

9, 1986 in trial preparation

negotiations

and

(after

court

adjournment) research respecting indemnification issues. (R. 461,
1624)
It was after the other parties arrived at a settlement on
January 9, 1986 that the exhibits showing counsel's defense time
on Smiths behalf and Smiths' time were offered and testimony was
proffered regarding indemnification. (R. 1624; Tr. 1181-1984)
Because the Trial Court disallowed all trial preparation
time, conference time and settlement negotiation time on January
9, 1986, Western has been allowed a de facto offset for whatever
limited allowed pre-January 9, 1986 counsel time was utilized in
stating Smiths' indemnification claims in the pleadings and pretrial order.
None of counsel's defense services as recorded and outlined
for the Trial Court from March 5, 1984 through January 8, 1986,
the defense services time period allowed by the Court, show any
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time at all on indemnification issues. (R. 461, 463-469)
The first research on indemnification issues in preparation
for

the

post-trial

memoranda

to

be

submitted

respecting

indemnification (Tr. 1192) was started late on the day of the
mid-trial settlement - January 9, 1986. (R. 461)
Western's assertion Plaintiffs were not really suing Smiths
for anything they needed to defend against ignores the record to
the contrary.

The findings themselves

summarize

the claims

asserted against Smiths in the pre-trial order (R. 1606) and the
new ones made during the course of trial. (R. 1608)
Western likewise ignores the evidence which fully supports
the $100.00 per hour rate allowed (R. 457; Tr. 1185; R. 1373-74;
Tr.

1756 p. 126) which

the Trial Court referred to in its

findings. (R. 1623)
Western's counsel submitted no evidence to rebut Smiths'
evidence $100 per hour was an objectively fair and reasonable
commercial litigation defense rate.
The

award

for

defense

legal

services

mandated

by

the

indemnity section of the corporation code is supported, indeed
compelled, by substantial competent evidence and therefore should
not be disturbed on appeal.

Rule 52(a) URCP, Doelle v. Bradley,

784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989).
POINT VIII
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED
ON THE INDEMNITY AWARDED
The Trial Court allowed Smiths pre-judgment interest on the
limited indemnity awards it made under the principles referred to
by this Court in Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222
(Ut.App. 1990). (R. 1640)
The issue of when pre-judgment interest is allowed in Utah
appears to have been first comprehensively addressed in Fell v.

Union Pac. Ry. Co. , 88 Pac. 1003 (Utah 1907), a tort case for
injury to sheep from negligent delay in transit.

The trial court

found the damages from death, shrinkage in loss and price and
allowed legal interest from the date damages were demanded.

The

interest allowance was sustained on appeal because the damages
were complete and the amount of loss fixed as of a particular
time.

The Supreme Court held the true test is not whether the

damages are unliquidated, but whether the injury and consequent
damages are complete and must be ascertained as of a particular
time and in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known
standards of value which the court must follow in fixing the
damages rather than being guided by its judgment in assessing
past and/or future injury based on elements not measurable by any
fixed standards of value.

Fell v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 88 Pac.

1003, 1007.
Fell further said that general justice is never promoted by
efforts

to reach

it by ignoring sound principles of law in

particular cases; allowing interest is a mild way of offering a
premium (cost) for withholding money; that there is no reason a
person sustaining damages should not receive just what he has
lost as nearly as such may be accomplished in a court of justice
and that if at the time of injury plaintiff restores/replaces
injured property with his own money he is entitled to interest on
that money to the date of payment because if he had loaned the
money to someone he certainly would be entitled to interest, and
if he borrowed it from someone, he would likely have to pay
interest for its use.

So, by being awarding legal interest, he

is simply placed in statu quo, nothing short of which is full
compensation, which is what the law aims to accomplish.
1003, 1006, 1007.
A?

88 Pac.

If Smiths borrowed to replace the income they lost doing
defense accounting services for themselves/Western and to pay
their counsel, surely they would have paid interest.

By being

awarded legal interest, they are placed in statu quo, what is
surely what the law aims to accomplish.
In Farnworth v. Jensen, 217 P.2d 571 (Utah 1950), a quiet
title action and for possession, the Supreme Court said interest
is the compensation allowed by law for the use, detention or
forbearance of money or its equivalent and that interest by way
of damages is allowed as damages for the unlawful detention of
money, citing 30 Am. Jur. Section 2.

217 P.2d 571, 575.

Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301 (Ut.App. 1987) held
the successful plaintiff in a breach of contract action entitled
to pre-judgment interest notwithstanding failure to specifically
plead or request it because the interest issue is injected by law
into every action for the payment of past-due money.
Western misconstrues Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d
1222 (Ut.App. 1990) by implying it restrictively redefined the
circumstances under which pre-judgment interest is allowed to
Western's view of a "fixed with accuracy" standard.
Here the trial court did fix Smiths' awards with accuracy.
Hours

times

modest

rates measured

by

objectively

standards of value per hour equals accuracy.

measurable

Smith v. Linmar

denied pre-judgment interest under the facts of that case since
the

crop

damage

there

at

issue

was

"not

ascertainable

in

accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known standards of
value".

796 P.2d 1222, 1226.

Western cites not one authority to support the proposition
that rates for professional accounting and legal services are not
ascertainable in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and
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known standards of value.
Western cites Jorgensen v. John Clay and Co., 660 P.2d 229
(Utah 1983) and Resner v. Northern Pac. Ry., 520 P.2d 655 (Mont.
1974).
In Jorgensen,, the Utah Supreme Court held a seller of sheep
entitled

to

interest

on

the difference

between what

should have

received

and what he actually

seller

received, because

regardless of variability of the weight of the sheep, seller's
damages were mathematically calculated.
Resner was a Montana wrongful death claim.

The case holds

that Montana tort claims do not bear interest until the amount
of damages is determined by a judgment.

The case does not at all

illustrate any supposed general rule that interest is allowed
only on judgments as Western claims.
Pre-judgment interest runs from the date of the original
judgment even when the award is amended in the course of or after
appeal

proceedings.

Dursteler

v.

Dursteler,

733

P.2d

850

(Id.App. 1987).
The Trial Court clearly followed fixed rules of evidence and
known standards of value in determining Smiths1 indemnity claims
and was correct in allowing pre-judgment interest thereon from
the date Smiths were "successful on the merits or otherwise",
hence became entitled to payment, but were denied payment, of
mandatory statutory indemnification.
POINT IX
SMITHS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER
THE COST OF SEEKING INDEMNIFICATION
Smiths

sought

recovery

of

their

expenses

in

seeking

indemnification from the Trial Court (see e.g. R. 1371-84, 1500)
but the Trial Court denied recovery. (R. 1624-29; 1630)
Smiths appealed the Trial Courts denial of this expense by

Notice of Appeal dated August 15, 1990.
Subparagraph

(3) of Section

16-4-10(c), UCA

(1953) uses

mandatory terms requiring corporations to indemnify successfully
defending officer/directors:
". . . H E SHALL BE INDEMNIFIED AGAINST EXPENSES
(INCLUDING ATTORNEYS1 FEES ACTUALLY AND REASONABLY
INCURRED BY HIM IN CONNECTION THEREWITH."
(emphasis
added)
Smiths submit that legal expenses incurred in seeking the
very indemnification for successful defense of a suit, action or
proceeding which is mandated by the statute should certainly be
deemed included in expenses "actually and reasonably incurred in
connection therewith".

(emphasis added)

Substantial expense has been incurred by Smiths by reason of
Western's refusal to pay the initial indemnification awarded and
by

reason

of

all

the proceedings

taken since by reason of

Western's continuing refusal to pay.
The Amended Memorandum Decision of this Court states that
although the statute would not allow "an award of attorney's fees
for matters beyond the scope of the statute having no correlation
to the Smiths being named as defendants. . .",
"no

insurmountable

reasonably

incurred

difficulty
in

with

obtaining

the
the

this Court had

notion

very

that

fees

indemnification

provided for by the statute might fairly be characterized as fees
'in connection' with the defense for which indemnification is
due".

(R. 1268) (emphasis added)
Certainly no part of the legal services rendered to Smiths

were for matters "beyond the scope" of the statute having "no
correlation" to Smiths being sued officer/director defendants.
All services performed were rendered only because Smiths were
wrongfully

sued and have had to long pursue their right of

indemnification in the same proceeding.
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The case exactly in point is Professional Insurance Company
of N. Y. v. Barry, 60 Misc.2d

424, 303 N.Y.S.2d

556 (S.Ct.

1969), affirmed unanimously, 302 N.Y.S.2d 722.
In that case, a sued director sought an allowance of his
defense

expenses

pendente

lite.

The

New York

statute, in

essentially the same grammatical terms as appear in subparagraph
(3) of Section 16-10-4(o) provided for indemnification of "such
reasonable

expenses,

including

attorney's

fees.

necessary in connection with (the) defense".

. . as are

The corporation

contended the legal expenses incurred in enforcing the director's
right to indemnification were not includable expense under the
statute

because

defense.

they

were

not

necessary

to

the

director's

The court did not agree and held such also should be

indemnified, holding:
Obviously if it were not for the action commenced
. . . there would be no assertion. . . of rights to
indemnification . . . . The allowance of expenses. . .
is involved only where the corporation has failed to
provide indemnification and it makes no difference
whether the allowance is sought within the ambit of a
derivative. . . or non-derivative. . . category as long
as such allowance is necessary in connection with the
defense in the litigation. The
Statutory machinery
set up. . . manifests this interpretation.
The
provision of Business Corporation Law. . . subdivision
(c) has been described as a desirable policy expedient
because of its tendency to encourage directors and
officers to assume stewardship responsibilities. . . .
303 N.Y.S.2d 555, 561.
Utah's indemnification

statute does not limit attorneys'

fees to "only those" incurred in defending.

The cost of seeking

indemnification is "actually and reasonably incurred" expense "in
connection" with the litigation defended.
If
construed

Utah's
with

indemnification
a view

statute

to effect

is

to

be

liberally

its object and to promote

justice, the interpretive standard mandated by Section 68-3-2 UCA
(1953), its broad "in connection with" language must be construed
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to cover the legal expense of seeking intransigently withheld
indemnification.
nevertheless

Otherwise
have

burdensome

been

legal

successfully

expense
visited

will
upon

officers/directors Smiths who served conscientiously and in good
faith and were successful on the merits or otherwise and the
object of the statute will have been defeated solely by means of
continued litigiousness.
If Smiths must bear their costs of seeking and reseeking and
defending and redefending their indemnification awards on appeal,
they will not have been fully indemnified for their attorney's
fees in connection with the litigation, but will be required to
shoulder

substantial

personal

economic

loss,

a

result

not

intended by but contrary to the purpose of the indemnification
statute.
Contractual

provisions

allowing

attorney's

fees

to

the

prevailing party are interpreted to allow recovery of attorney's
fees incurred by reason of an appeal and no reason whatsoever
exists for refusing to follow the same principle in this case
where

a

statute

allows

officers/directors.

fees

to

successfully

defending

See e.g. Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372

(Utah 1984) and Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 391 (Utah 1984).
Smiths' counsel's affidavits and time summaries of legal
services

and

legal

costs

incurred

in

seeking,

obtaining,

defending and further pursuing indemnification after the January
9,

1986

mid-trial

settlement

through

March

25,

1989

were

submitted to and received by the Trial Court. (R. 456-62, 13711384; Tr. 1756 p. 140-141)
Smiths' counsel testified and was cross examined concerning
the same and respecting the additional 34.5 hours of services
rendered

through

the

date

of
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an

evidentiary

hearing

held

September 13, 1989. (Tr. 1756 p. 123-140)
Additional

services continued

to be necessary after the

September 13, 1989 hearing as shown by the record of proceedings
since then, including appeal proceedings.
The
lower

cross-examined

court

concerning

undisputed

evidence

Smiths' costs

of

presented

to the

seeking, obtaining,

defending and seeking reassessed indemnification to September 13,
1989 is in the record before this Court, along with the evidence
supporting the lower court's finding with respect to a reasonable
hourly rate.

(R. 456-62, 1371-1384; Tr. 1185-86; Tr. 1756 p.123-

141)
The

facts concerning

such services are not in material

dispute so that the effect thereof becomes a question of law this
Court can determine.

Cf. Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87

(Utah App. 1990)
Smiths therefore ask this Court to determine a reasonable
Attorney's fee and costs for seeking indemnification based on
such evidence to September 13, 1989.
This case should then be remanded for the limited purpose of
determining what additional award for legal expense should be
made respecting Smiths' ongoing expenses respecting collection of
indemnity since that time.

Cf. Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 662

(Utah 1985)
CONCLUSION
The

lower

court's

indemnity

awards

for

Smiths' defense

accounting services should be increased from the $35.00 per hour
award to $100.00 per hour.

In any event, the awards made should

be affirmed.
The lower court's indemnity award for the legal cost of
Smiths' defense should be affirmed.
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The trial court's allowance of pre-judgment interest should
be affirmed.
The

lower

court's

refusal

to allow

Smiths

their

legal

expenses incurred in enforcing Smiths' right of indemnification
was an error of law that should be reversed.
This

court

should

determine

what

legal

fees/costs

of

seeking indemnification should have been awarded by the trial
court for the services of Smiths' legal counsel from January 8,
1986

through

September

13, 1989

and direct the entry of a

judgment for that amount and remand the case for the limited
purpose of determining what further award should be made for the
services of Smiths' counsel since that time, including services
on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED/this, / /

day of April, 1991.

DAV?D T . C O O K ,
Attorney
for
Defendants, Appellees and
Cross Appellants
Willard L. Smith and Keith C. Smith
Served the foregoing Brief by mailing four copies thereof to
James A. Mclntyre, Attorney for Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc.,
360 East 4500 South, Suite 3, Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-0280,
this

/'? - day of April, 1991 j \

49

ADDENDUM I
SECTION 16-10-4(0), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953)
(o)(l)
A corporation shall have power to indemnify any
person who was or is a party or is threatened to be made a party
to any threatened, pending or completed action, suit or
proceeding, whether
civil, criminal, administrative or
investigative (other than an action by or in the right of the
corporation) by reason of the fact that he is or was a director,
officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was
serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer,
employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint
venture, trust or other enterprise, against expenses (including
attorney's fees),
judgments, fines and amounts paid in
settlement actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection
with such action, suit or proceeding if he acted in good faith
and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to
the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to any
criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to
believe his conduct was unlawful. The termination of any action,
suit or proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, conviction, or
upon a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent, shall not, of
itself, create a presumption that the person did not act in good
faith and in a manner which he reasonably believed to be in or
not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and with
respect to any criminal action or proceeding, had reasonable
cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful.
(2) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person
who was or is a party or is threatened to be made a party to any
threatened, pending or completed action or suit by or in the
right of the corporation to procure a judgment in its favor by
reason of the fact that he is or was a director, officer,
employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the
request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or
agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust
or other enterprise against expenses (including attorney's fees)
actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection with the
defense or settlement of such action or suit if he acted in good
faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not
opposed to the best interests of the corporation and except that
no indemnification shall be made in respect of any claim, issue
or matter as to which such person shall have been adjudged to be
liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of his
duty to the corporation unless and only to the extent that the
court in which such action or suit was brought shall determine
upon application that, despite the adjudication of liability but
in view of all circumstances of the case, such person is fairly
and reasonably entitled to indemnity for such expenses which such
1

court shall deem proper*
(3) TO THE EXTENT THAT A DIRECTOR, OFFICER, EMPLOYEE OR
AGENT OF A CORPORATION HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL ON THE MERITS OR
OTHERWISE IN DEFENSE OF ANY ACTION, SUIT OR PROCEEDING REFERRED
TO IN (1) OR (2) OF THIS SUBSECTION, OR IN DEFENSE OF ANY CLAIM,
ISSUE OR MATTER THEREIN, HE SHALL BE INDEMNIFIED AGAINST EXPENSES
(INCLUDING ATTORNEY'S FEES) ACTUALLY AND REASONABLY INCURRED BY
HIM IN CONNECTION THEREWITH, (emphasis added).
(4)
Any indemnification under (1) or (2) of this
subsection (unless ordered by a court) shall be made by the
corporation only as authorized in the specific case upon a
determination that indemnification of the director, officer,
employee or agent is proper in the circumstances because he has
met the applicable standard of conduct set forth in (1) or (2) of
this subsection. Such determination shall be made by the board
of directors by a majority vote of a quorum of the directors, or
by the shareholders.
(5)
Expenses incurred in defending a civil or criminal
action, suit or proceeding may be paid by the corporation in
advance of the final disposition of such action, suit or
proceeding as authorized in the manner provided in (4) of this
subsection upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of the
director, officer, employee or agent to repay such amount unless
it shall ultimately be determined that he is entitled to be
indemnified by the corporation as authorized in this section.
(6) The indemnification provided by this subsection shall
not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those
indemnified may be entitled under any bylaw, agreement, vote of
shareholders or disinterested directors or otherwise, both as to
action in his official capacity and as to action in another
capacity while holding such office and shall continue as to a
person who has ceased to be a director, officer, employee or
agent and shall inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors and
administrators of such a person.
(7) A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain
Insurance on behalf of any person who is or was a director,
officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was
serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer,
employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint
venture, trust or other enterprise against any liability
asserted against him and incurred by him in any such capacity or
arising out of his status as such, whether or not the corporation
would have the power to indemnify him against such liability
under the provisions of this subsection.

2

Subparagraph (3) above as restated in the 1987 revision of
the indemnificarion statute reads as follows:
(c) TO THE EXTENT THAT A DIRECTOR, OFFICER,
EMPLOYEE, OR AGENT OF A CORPORATION HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL
ON THE MERITS OR OTHERWISE IN DEFENSE OF ANY ACTION,
SUIT OR PROCEEDING REFERRED TO IN SUBSECTION (2) (a) OR
(b), OR IN DEFENSE OF ANY CLAIM, ISSUE, OR MATTER
THEREIN, HE SHALL BE INDEMNIFIED AGAINST EXPENSES,
INCLUDING ATTORNEYS' FEES, WHICH HE ACTUALLY AND
REASONABLY INCURRED IN CONNECTION THEREWITH. (emphasis
added)
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ADDENDUM II
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Dated April 18, 1990

DAVID S. COOK
Attorney for Defendants Smith
R5 West 400 North
Bountiful, UT 84010
Telephone: 292-7216
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BLAINE GOODRICH, DAVID HOYT,
VAL KIDMAN, STERLING JONES,
and DANIEL WAYMAN,
)

FINDINGS OF FACT

)

AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs.
'WESTERN AUTO RADIATOR CO., INC.,
a Utah corporation, and WILLIAM
W. BOWERBANK, JONATHAN BOWERBANK, ]
KIM BOWERBANK, WILLARD L. SMITH,
i
KEITH C. SMITH,
!
Defendants.

Case No. C84-924
(Judge Dean E. Conder)

]

This matter was tried before the Court on December 10th,
11 th and 13th, 1985 and again on January 8th and 9th, 1986.

On

January 9th, 1986, the Plaintiffs and Defendants, Western Auto
Radiator Co., Inc., William W. Bowerbank, Jonathan Bowerbank and
Kim Bowerbank advised the court they had agreed to a settlement
of the issues among those parties, the terms of which were stated
for the record and the terms of which were incorporated in a
stipulation between those parties dated January 31, 1986 on file
herein.
The

Court

reserved

the issue of

the Smiths' claim for

indemnification for their professional CPA time and for their

attorney's fees.
Evidence was proffered upon said issues on January 9, 1986
and thereafter affidavits and memorandum were submitted.
The Court ruled on said reserved issues on May 5, 1986 and
on May 8, 1986 signed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a
judgment against Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc. only.
Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc. appealed the judgment.
Utah

Supreme

Court

referred

the

case

to the Utah

The

Court of

Appeals, which issued a Memorandum Decision on March 16, 1988
and,

following

a

Petition

for

Rehearing,

a

second

Amended

Memorandum Decision on May 9, 1988, in which the Utah Court of
Appeals remanded the case for such reassessment of the judgment
as might be

appropriate

and for the entry of more detailed

findings of fact.
Following remand, Defendants Smith responded to a motion
made by Western for release of the supersedeas bond substitute
and responded to written discovery requests made by Western and
as part of their responses annexed comprehensive summaries of
services.

Additional sworn written evidence was submitted by

Smiths in the form of an Affidavit of Keith C. Smith dated March
27, 1989 and Affidavits of David S. Cook dated March 27, 1989 and
September 12, 1989.
The parties submitted additional memoranda and on September
13, 1989 an evidentiary hearing was held at which testimony was
taken and at which it was stipulated in open court that the
2
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affidavits and supporting documents submitted by Smiths could be
received in evidence, the same as though the witnesses had so
testified.
The case having been fully submitted and argued and the
Court having considered the evidence and memoranda submitted by
the parties and good cause appearing, the Court now makes the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
in

Suit was brought against Willard Smith and Keith Smith

their

capacities

as

officers/directors

of

Western

Auto

Radiator, Inc., also named $ defendant.
2.

Willard L. Smith and Keith C. Smith are independent

certified public accountants who maintain offices in Salt Lake
City, Utah.
3.

Willard L. Smith operated Western Auto Radiator Co.,

Inc. on a full time basis for fifteen years prior to the time
William Bowerbank became its operating manager.
4.
to

Willard L. Smith, with the assistance of Keith Smith as

recent

years

work,

prepared

all

Western's

financial

statements and tax returns.
5.

Smith assisted with the tax planning that was part of

the 1977 preferred stock sales agreement and 1982 common stock
sales
William

agreement

between

Bowerbank

as

Plaintiffs

seller,

and

as

buyers

the

1982

and

Defendant

building

sales

contract between Bowerbank as seller and Western as buyer, issues
3

concerning which were involved in the litigation.
6.
Western

The accounting and bookkeeping services performed for
Auto Radiator

included

providing

Co., Inc. by Willard

bookkeeping

and

accounting

respect to the performance of said contracts.
Keith Smith functioned

and Keith Smith
services

in

Willard Smith and

as President and Secretary of Western

Auto Radiator, Inc. for -relat-i-vely small salaries of $2,000 and ""Tr"^$500"-per year respectively-?—a**d—£•&€—per mooting—#e*—attendance

'\ *•

at meetings of its Board of Directors.
7.

Smiths were named officers and directors of Western in

the January 2, 1982 Common Stock Sales Agreement.

Willard L.

Smith had served continuously as a director for Western from the
time of its incorporation in 1966.
8.

In December

1977, four of Western's key employees,

plaintiffs Blaine Goodrich, David L. Hoyt, Val G. Kidman and
Sterling C. Jones, entered into an agreement with William W.
Bowerbank,

who

at

that

point

outstanding stock of Western,

owned

all

of

the

issued

and

to purchase all of his preferred

stock for $200,000.00 payable on agreed terms over a term of 10
years.
Western

agreed

to

pay

each

purchaser

a

monthly

sufficient to enable him to make his monthly payment.

bonus
These

employees were given an option to buy all of Bowerbank's common
stock for $100,000.00 at the end of the 10-year period.
9.

In January

1982, the

same

four employees

and one

4
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additional employee, plaintiff

Daniel Wayraan, entered into a

modification of the 1977 agreement with Bowerbank under which
they agreed to purchase his common stock for $100,000.00 payable
as in the agreement provided.
Western agreed to pay monthly bonuses to the 5 purchasers
sufficient in amount to enable them to make the monthly payment.
10.

The 1982 agreement provided that 5 officer/directors,

and one additional director, would manage Western and implement
the agreements:
Wayman,

Blaine Goodrich, Secretary and Director; Daniel

Director;

President

Bowerbank's

son,

and Director; Bowerbank!s

Jonathan

Bowerbank, Vice

son, Kim Bowerbank, Vice

President and Director; Willard L. Smith, who had been the fulltime manager of Western for several years prior to Bowerbank1s
assuming management as President and Chairman of the Board of
Directors; and Keith C. Smith as Treasurer and Director.
11.

The

1982 agreement

further provided Western would

furnish Bowerbank an automobile, fringe benefits, and could use
his services as a consultant for certain compensation.
12.

At or about the time the 1982 agreement was signed a

Consulting Agreement was also signed by Bowerbank and Western,
under which Bowerbank agreed to participate in and report on
industry conventions, report observed variations from Western's
standard

operating

procedures

and

advise

and

consult

with

Western's Board of Directors for $500.00 per month.
13.

Under an additional January 1982 agreement, Bowerbank
5
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sold Western the land and building long occupied by Western for
payments as therein provided.
14•

Western continued to operate profitably and bonuses

were accrued to the purchasing Plaintiff employees and the amount
thereof

was

paid

to Bowerbank

through

accounting

procedures

administered by Directors Smith.
15.

The purchasing employees grew resentful of Bowerbank1s

continued observations and demands and in February 1984 filed
these proceedings against Western, Bowerbank, Bowerbank's two
director sons and Smiths, asserting Bowerbank would not permit
Plaintiffs to control Western: that certificates showing more
shares of preferred stock had been delivered to them than the
corporation had issued to Bowerbank; that such certificates were
ultra vires or watered stock; that an accounting was necessary
and sought an order compelling Bowerbank to deposit his common
stock with the clerk of the court.
16.

By

Amended

Complaint,

the

purchasing

employee

Plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that Bowerbank's director
sons and defendants Smith had fraudulently diverted Western's
assets; permitted Kim Bowerbank to purchase a Western vehicle for
less

than

its value; had Western provide

insurance

for the

automobile after it was sold; had Western sell a Western vehicle
to Jonathan

Bowerbank

for

less than

its value; had Western

provide insurance and repairs for the automobile after it was
sold; had Western provide health insurance to Jonathan Bowerbank
6

and had paid Willard L. Smith $2,000 per year and Kim Bowerbank
and Jonathan Bowerbank $1,000 per year and Keith Smith $500 per
year as director's fees without having received any services from
them as directors.
The Amended

Complaint

further

charged Willard Smith and

Bowerbank with having changed the stock purchase payment date,
causing Western to pay funds to Bowerbank early and claimed that
the

January

Plaintiffs;
wrongfully

1982

Consulting

that

Bowerbank,

excluded

the

Agreement was kept
through

purchasing

Directors
employees

secret

from

Smith,

had

from

managing

Western; and that directors Bowerbank and Smith had conspired to
issue watered stock,
17.

Later in the litigation, the purchasing employees filed

a Second Amended Complaint alleging that a number of Western
checks were improperly paid to Bowerbank; that director Willard
L.

Smith

conspired

with

Bowerbank

to

set

the

price

for

Bowerbank's land and building above market value and demanded the
contract price be reduced or judgment be entered against Willard
L. Smith for $155,000,00.
18.

In

the

Pre-Trial

Order, the Plaintiff

purchasing

employees claimed defendant Willard L. Smith, Bowerbank and an
attorney had

represented

that Plaintiffs would be purchasing

200,000 shares of preferred stock for $1.00 per share and 100,000
shares of common stock; that the purchasing employees should have
an accounting of all payments made to Bowerbank under the 1977
7
5<JJ-

and 1982 agreements; that payments had been doubled requiring a
recomputation of interest; that Bowerbank or Willard L. Smith
were obligated to contribute additional capital to Western at the
rate of $1.00 per share for 300,000 shares; that the land and
building price should be reduced; that the Consulting Agreement
should be

rescinded; that directors Smith and Bowerbank had

functioned merely

as William Bowerbank's

alter

egos and had

breached their fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs in various respects
and had not earned their director's fees.
19.

Director/Defendants

Smith

responded

to

Plaintiffs

various claims by asserting there had been no representation that
there were 200,000 shares of preferred stock or 100,000 shares of
common stock; that incorrect certificates should be corrected;
that all contract payments had been properly made as required by
the contracts; that the land and building contract was fairly
negotiated in good faith and was more favorable to Western than
had Western continued to rent; that the Consulting Agreement was
entered into in good faith and that Western had received value
therefrom; that Smiths were not, in fact, the alter egos of
William Bowerbank and had, throughout their services as directors
and officers, acted properly and had not permitted anyone to
convert or wrongfully take or use Western's property; that Smiths
had earned the modest director's fees paid them and raised other
defenses
charges

and claimed
for

their

right of indemnification for reasonable
professional

time

consumed

in

preparing

8

not

accounting

summaries and data required by the litigation in

their defense and for the legal expense of their defense.
20.
defenses

Western adopted, by reference, all of the positions and
of

Smiths

indemnification

with

and

did

respect

not

oppose

to

Smiths'

Smiths1

claims

professional

for
time

consumed by the litigation and attorney's fees.
21.
settlement

During the 2 1/2 days of trial before the mid-trial
reached

by

Plaintiffs

and

William

Bowerbank,

Plaintiffs, through their counsel, in the course of examining
first William Bowerbank and then Willard L. Smith from a 700 page
2 volume exhibit, asserted

in effect that Willard Smith had

incompetently failed to perform his duties as officer, director
and

accountant

and

had

breached

his

fiduciary

duties

by

permitting Bowerbank to raid Western's treasury^ unfairly imposing
agreements on Plaintiffs and controlling Western's operations.
Plaintiff

implied

Smiths had Western make improper

loans to

Bowerbank without authorization of Western's Board of Directors
and/or without paying interest and/or without repayment; that
Smiths had Western pay too much building rent to Bowerbank; that
dividends were improperly paid to Bowerbank by aid of Smiths;
that Bowerbank was given improper double payments by Smiths on
his stock purchase contract; that Smith improperly had Western
pay

Bowerbank

a

salary;

that

the purchasing

employees were

coerced by Smith to enter into the Common Stock Sales Agreement;
that secret meetings were held by Smiths to which plaintiff
9

CO

purchasing

employee

directors

Goodrich

and

Wayman

were

not

invited; that there was impropriety or error on the part of Smith
in

the

original

stock

issued

Western's beginning business

to

Bowerbank

in exchange

for

assets; that Smith breached his

fiduciary duty by purchasing

an automobile

that Western was

obligated to provide Bowerbank for cash rather than on credit and
that

Smith

had

acted

improperly

with

respect

to

loans,

dividends, consulting fees and rent paid by Western to Bowerbank;
that

Smith's

participation

Agreements was contrary

in developing

to Plaintiffs1

the

Stock

Purchase

interests; that Smith

structured such Agreement unfairly to Plaintiffs and that Smith
had kept Plaintiffs unaware of the agreements or the meaning or
operation thereof; that Smith had made accounting errors in some
of Western's financial records; that the purchasing employees
were

improperly

excluded by

Smith

from board meetings; that

Smith breached his fiduciary duty by allowing Bowerbank to select
the automobile Western agreed to furnish Bowerbank in 1983 and
other claims.
22.

The court made inquiry as to the relevance of the

examination of Plaintiffs' counsel in view of the statement of
issues contained in the Pre-trial Order and was advised that
Plaintiffs' trial approach was to determine whether Defendants
Smith had breached their fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs.
23.

The first day of trial was consumed by Plaintiffs'

counsel asking William Bowerbank questions about numerous checks
10

in a 700 page Exhibit lr the implication being that Smiths had
assisted Bowerbank in improperly diverting funds from Western.
That

night

Keith

Smith

prepared

a

comprehensive

accounting

showing all of the checks that had been issued by Western to
Bowerbank which tied the checks into the contracts.
24.

Substantial professional accounting service type time

was required of Smiths, prior to and at the trial researching,
furnishing and explaining accounting data relating to various
transactions and connecting payments questioned by counsel for
the purchasing employees to the contracts.
25.

Virtually all financial evidence produced at trial was

originally prepared and located by Smiths.

(See e.g. TR 822-

42,846-47 876-76 and Exhibits 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15,
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46 and 47.
Payments to Bowerbank were summarized by Keith Smith in
Exhibit 37.

(TR 872-1081).

Smiths1 summary of funds flowing to the purchasing employees
was made Exhibit 39.
26.

(TR 875).

Willard L. Smith testified concerning the background

and history of Western, including his management thereof on a
full-time basis for 15 years commencing in 1942.

He testified

that Western's tax returns and other financial records, regularly
and routinely were furnished to the Board of Directors, including
the director purchasing Plaintiff employees and that the same
11

00

clearly, continuous and correctly showed the number of shares
issued and outstanding.
27.

Smith

further

testified

that

the

scope

of

his

management responsibilities included oversight of wage levels,
working with employees, management of cash flow; review, analysis
and

working

through

business

problems

and

preparation

and

analysis of monthly, quarterly and annual financial statements;
he testified that under his direction Western grew from a net
worth

of

approximately

$280,000

in

1976

to a net worth of

approximately $620,000 in 1985 and that Western had increased
profits during the performance of the Stock Purchase Agreements
even when incurring the additional expense of adding the bonuses
which funded the stock purchase agreements to the purchasing
employees'

already

substantial

salaries;

and

that

Western's

retained earnings grew from $51,000 in 1977 to approximately
$240,000 on March 31, 1985.
28.

Smith testified concerning and explained the facts and

circumstances in respect to the payments to William Bowerbank
challenged by Plaintiffs and explained the purpose for, and value
and fairness to Western
premises

purchase

(and to Plaintiffs), of the business

agreement

and

consulting

agreement.

He

described a number of instances in which he and Bowerbank had
strongly
operating

disagreed

and

Smith's

position

officer had been implemented

decision.
12

as

Western's

chief

as Western's business

29.

Willard Smith prepared Exhibit 47 showing how the stock

certificates were in error and should be corrected and explained
it made no difference whether

the purchasing

employees were

buying 19,590 shares or 300,000 shares because all of Western's
business was included in the purchase.
30.

The purchasing employee who testified, Blaine Goodrich,

conceded, on cross examination, that he had the stock books in
his possession and subject to his access and review at all times;
that

he

signed

the

erroneously

prepared

preferred

stock

certificates as secretary of Western; that minutes he, himself,
had prepared showed that the financial condition of Western had
been discussed and reviewed; that he had discussed the company's
financial condition on many occasions with Willard Smith and had
access to Western's checks and bank statements as they were
received

at

the

corporation's

place

of

business, which

he

managed; that he had never been forbidden to make inquiries or
reviews

in

respect

to

financial

matters

and

had

served

continuously on Western's Board since its incorporation and was
authorized and did sign Western's checks and had done so since
the

late

function

1960's; that
of

Western's

his

compensation

profits

which

for

services was a

required

them

to

be

calculated annually; that he was aware of the treatment of bonus
payments as payments made on the Stock Purchase Contracts; that
he had signed the Articles of Amendment creating two classes of
stock which correctly recited the number of shares issues and
13

outstanding and had full opportunity to review the Articles of
Amendment and agreed the amount of Western's stated capital in
terms of preferred stock shares was not significant to him, as
all of Western's business was in effect included in the purchase
contracts.

Goodrich

Plaintiff

employees

Purchase

Agreements.

conceded

had

that

discussed

Minutes

he

all

of

entering
prepared

the
into

purchasing
the

recited

Stock

numerous

meetings had taken place regarding that subject matter in which
financial data had been reviewed; and showed that he had sought
and received independent legal advice; that the Plaintiffs had
authorized Willard Smith to negotiate an appropriate purchase
agreement with respect to the corporation's place of business
with William Bowerbank;

that the purchasing employees had never

asked Western's Board of Directors to reevaluate the building
purchase contract;

that all other matters of which complaint

was made in the suit had never been brought to the Board of
Directors; and that the basic reason the Plaintiffs had filed
suit was to gain control of Western through litigation and to
avoid the necessity of continuing to deal with Bowerbank.
31.

During the course of the third day of trial, the trial

court strongly suggested to the purchasing employee Plaintiffs
and William Bowerbank that a settlement should be made.

William

Bowerbank and Plaintiffs, with the acquiescence of Western, which
was

represented

by

independent

counsel, and Bowerbank1s

two

director sons, worked out a settlement on January 9, 1985, the
14

terms of which were stipulated in open court and later reduced to
writing.

The

settlement

involved

the

Plaintiffs

employees

withdrawing and abandoning all claims, including those asserted
against Smiths.

The

settlement

agreement provided

that the

purchasing employees would vote in a new slate of directors upon
receipt of the common stock under the terms provided in the
Settlement Agreement, and did so, replacing Smiths.
32.

No agreement was made with Smiths as to their claim for

indemnification, but it was agreed and provided

in an Order

stipulated by all counsel, including counsel then representing
Western, and counsel for the purchasing employees, that the Court
would determine such matter, based on the evidence thus far heard
and upon proffers of evidence and memoranda to be submitted by
counsel for the purchasing employees and by counsel for Smiths.
33.

Additional evidence was proffered by Smiths, which

proffer was accepted by the Court with the consent of counsel for
the purchasing employees.
34.

Smiths proffered evidence, and the Court finds, that

meetings held with Kim Bowerbank and Jonathan Bowerbank and Keith
Smith after the latter became officers/directors were intended to
acquaint them with Western's financial condition and functioning;
that such meetings were not held with any intent of excluding
anyone

or

making

any

secret

arrangements;

that

numerous

conferences, formal and informal were held with Blaine Goodrich
in which the financial and other affairs of the company were
15

discussed; that Willard Smith had never gained the impression
from Blaine Goodrich that he had questions or problems or matters
of

concern

which

were

unaddressed

concerning

Western's

operations; that the wages paid to the purchasing employees were
higher than the wages paid by competing companies and that, not
only

bonuses,

but

amounts

equal

to

the

taxes

payable

on

additional bonuses were accrued by Western to the accounts of the
purchasing

employees,

so

their

acquisition

of

the

stock of

Western would be on a favorable cost-free basis.
35.
that

Smiths further proffered evidence, and the Court finds,

Smiths

exercised

their

professional

business

judgment

independent of William Bowerbank in performing their duties as
officers and directors without personal gain.
36.
their

Smiths proffer included evidence adequately proving

claims

for

indemnification

for

professional

accounting

service time in preparing data for their defense and attorney's
fees and costs incurred in their defense.
summaries

which

were

later

supplemented

Smiths presented time
by

additional

time

summaries and Smiths' Affidavits showing their professional time
and that it was not charged to Western as accounting services and
that

it

was

explanations,

reasonably
data

expended

and

factual

in

providing

accounting-type

accounting
evidence

necessary to Smiths' defense.
37.

Smiths said professional time—could and would otherwise

have been employed by them in providing professional services to
16

^

paying clients in the oourco of Smitho*—accounting/GPA practice, 0*

V

Smit&s-J—proffer was,—and the Court finds,—they could havo charged
relatively modoGt—ratoo—si—from—$40*00—fee—$75.00—per hour—§er

^>

such time.
38.

Smiths could have hired an- expe-rt CPA at their expense -s^*^

to review and analyze Westernls—aceount-ing records—and history * ^ v
and - to -provide

accounting— explanations-*

data—aftd—factual

\*

accounting type evidence —in -Smiths' --defense-*—and had thoy done

%

so, such expense would, - under-the—circumstances—of—this—case
outlined above, clearly -iiave -been- recoverable—expense—ei—their
defense

within

the

intent,-

scope- and—meaning

of

the

indemnification section -of—the-corporat-ion- Code.
39.

Smiths use of their own professional time to provide

accounting data, summaries and exhibits in their own defense was
more efficient and less costly than would have been the case had
an outside CPA been hired, because of Smiths1 familiarity of
Western's records and the transactions Plaintiffs put in issue.
40. — T h e r e - is -no—legal—or — faetual—justification—for ^Tr*^
interpreting/ applying—the
Corporation ~ Code

indemnification

section

of

the *'\ ^

unfavorable—to—Smiths—because—they—in—effect

V*

hired themselves less- expensively--than-^-iir'-i-ng an outside CPA to
prepare—aooouftte-ing data for their defense.
41.

The -economi-c -expense--to—Smirths—of—losing the market

value-of-tiieii: own -professional--^irae-irnr-providing accounting data

i^^
*}

\

y/ T:^

for -their-own defense- isr~the—eeenomic—and—legal—equivalent of
17
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incurring the-expense of hiring a CPA to do the same thing.
42.

Smiths' accounting explanations, accounting data and

accounting exhibits were necessary to Western's defense as well
as to Smiths personal defense and should be paid by Western in
all events.

However, such multiple usefulness of data does not

take the actual economic expense to Smiths of preparing such out
of the scope of the indemnification statute.
43.

The Court finds the indemnification statute should be

liberally

and

intended

broadly

remedial

interpreted

purpose

in

which

is

light

to

of

its

encourage

independent professional people, including

obvious

competent,

CPA's to serve as

directors of corporations by removing the risk they will be
exposed to burdensome litigation expense which they are involved
in

because

of

their

services

as

directors

and

which

they

successfully defend, or in respect to which they show good-faith
adherence to their duties.
44.

Smiths'

litigation
Western

professional

CPA

time

consumed

by

the

in their defense was not billed to, or paid by,

in

the

course

of

Smiths

providing

their

regular

accounting services to Western during the course of litigation.
45.
adopted

After the suit was filed, Western's Board of Directors
a

resolution

by

majority

vote

(the

two

Plaintiff

Directors voting against it) authorizing indemnification of the
four Defendant Directors, including Smiths as to attorney's fees,
costs and expenses.

This resolution stated that all of the
18

Defendant Directors acted in good faith and in the best interests
of Western in respect to the matters alleged in the purchasing
employees Amended Complaint.

This resolution required repayment

to Western of any amounts advanced unless it should be ultimately
determined that the directors were entitled to be indemnified.
46.

Each of the Defendants Smith acted in good faith and in

a manner which he reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed,
to the best interests of Western.
47.

Neither of Defendants Smith diverted corporate assets

or opportunities; competed with Western in any way and neither
engaged in any self dealing or obtained any secret profits.
48.
and

Because of the mid-trial settlement between Plaintiffs

William

included

Bowerbank

dismissing

which

terminated

the

litigation

and

all claims against all parties including

Smiths, it was not necessary for the Court to make findings of
fact

and

conclusions

against Smiths.

of

law

respecting

Plaintiffs'

claims

The Court does find that Smiths' evidence,

including their testimony, was credible and basically refuted the
claims

asserted

explained

by

Plaintiffs

and correlated

against

accounting

them

and

adequately

data and checks paid to

Bowerbank questioned by Plaintiffs.
49.
successful

Directors
on

the

Smiths

merits

or

were,

in

otherwise

substance

and

effect,

in defending

against

Plaintiffs' charges against them because all claims against them
were

dropped

by

Plaintiffs

at

the

point

of

the

mid-trial

001X18

settlement.

Such fact requires that Western indemnify Smiths

pursuant to Section 16-10-4(1)(3) U.C.A. (1953) (prior to 1987
amendments - now Section 16-10-(4)(2)(c) U.C.A.)•
Smiths1 evidence illustrated Smiths' professionalism

50.

and adherence to their duties as officers/directors of Western in
the face of considerable management difficulties and that Smiths'
efforts kept Western solvent, growing and properly operating and
independent
friction

proper

and

lack

business
of

decisions

effective

were

made,

communication

even

between

with
the

purchasing employees and William Bowerbank.
51.

The Court has reviewed the affidavits, time summaries

and other evidence submitted by Smiths in respect to the C.P.A.
time expended in their defense and in the defense of Western and
finds that 194.95 hours of professional services were reasonably
and necessarily expended by Willard L. Smith, in his own defense
and Western's defense.
figure by deducting

The Court has arrived at said 194.95 hour

from the Willard L. Smith expanded time

schedule which shows a total of 200.85 hours, the following:
A.

0.9 hours in September 1985 respecting copying

documents for William W. Bowerbank.
B.

1.00 hour expended October 1985 copying documents

for William W. Bowerbank.
C.

2.00

hours

of work

in December

1985 for Mr.

Bowerbank.
D.

2.00 hours September 1985 copying vouchers, which
20

tne court finds 10 be work which could have been performed by
secretarial help.
The Court has included in said 194.95 hours the 11 hours
shown on page 13 of the Willard L. Smith Time Summary annexed to
his Interrogatory Answers dated January 17, 1£89 because the
Court finds the time/expense of summarizing the indemnifiable
expense also reasonable indemnifiable expense.
52.

It appears from the evidence that 242.00 hours of

professional services were reasonable and necessarily expended by
Keith C. Smith in his own defense and in defense of Western.

The

Court has arrived at said 242.00 figure by deducting from the
Keith C. Smith Expanded Time Summary annexed to his Answers to
Interrogatories dated January 17, 1989, the following:
A.

4.2 hours November 28, 1985 which the Court finds

was work benefiting only defendant William Bowerbank.
B.

24 hours Court time December 1985 which the Court

finds was not necessarily expended

in his own defense since

Willard L. Smith was also present in Court and could and did
testify on behalf of both Smiths and Western.
The Court has included in said 242.00 hours the 12.5 hours
required to summarize the indemnifiable expense because the Court
finds such also reasonable indemnifiable expense.
53.

The hourly rate of compensation at which Smiths should

be indemnified, the Court finds to be the sum of $35.00 per hour.
Smiths calculated this rate had been effectively charged Western
21

for

professional

C.P.A.

time

in

providing

Western's

usual

accounting services, except for the effect of Smiths1 "flat rate11
billing practice.

(See Affidavit of Keith C. Smith dated march

27, 1989 and Exhibit "A" annexed thereto, showing an average of
$34.76

for

1984

and

$34.39

for

1985, which

the Court has

determined should be reasonably rounded to $35.00).
54.

The Court finds that the custom/practice of parties for

a long period of time should prevail in determining a reasonable
hourly rate, there being no other evidence of agreement as to
rates.
55.
per

hour

Willard L. Smith's allowable 194.95 hours times $35.00
is

$6,823.25.

To

this

figure

should

be

added

secretarial time of 2 hours at $6.32 per hour for $12.64, giving
a total of $6,835.89 due Willard Smith as indemnification for
the expense to him of his professional CPA time consumed in
providing financial evidence in defense of Plaintiffs1 charges.
56.

Keith C. Smith's allowable 242.00 hours times $35.00

per hour is $8,47 0.00 due Keith C. Smith as indemnification for
the expense to him of his professional CPA time consumed in
providing financial evidence in defense of Plaintiffs' charges.
57.

The Court finds that the time value difference in

Smiths "flat rate" billing practice, which normally resulted in
an actual average hourly return to Smiths of $51.86 per hour and
the rate the Court has allowed of $35.00 (approximately $17.00
per hour difference), which difference is roughly equivalent to
22

the difference between $35.00 per hour and the rate Smiths would
have charged paying clients for their time - $40.00 to $75.00 per
hour - together with the savings to Western in its not being
faced

with

paying

other

C.P.A.'s

whom

Smiths

could

have

supervised, whose rates would have been much higher than $35.00
or even $52.00 per hour ($100.00 per hour is suggested by Smiths1
evidence) adequately reflects and takes into consideration the
value of the time Smiths would have expended
another

C.P.A.

to

do

necessary

defense

in supervising

accounting

data and

summary work on behalf of Smiths/Western, which time/value the
opinion of the Court of Appeals suggests should not be considered
recoverable expense under the indemnification statute.
58.

Smiths actually, reasonably and necessarily incurred

attorney's fees and costs for Smiths' defense of this matter.
59.

Oral evidence, affidavits and time/expense summaries

have been submitted showing the legal services rendered to Smiths
in connection with their defense in this matter through the date
of

the

mid-trial

settlement

between

Plaintiff

and

William

Bowerbank and with respect to seeking Smiths1 indemnification,
including indemnification for legal services in post-settlement
proceedings and in connection with the appeal taken by Western
and in post-appeal proceedings relating to the indemnification
issues and the motion made by Western for the release of its
supersedeas bond substitute; in evaluating the decisions rendered
by

the

Court

of

Appeals;

reviewing
23

and

analyzing

the

interrogatories received from Western directed to the Smiths and
preparing,
material

revising

for

and

completing

submission

indemnification

issues,

to

the

answers

Court

including

with

and

assembling

respect

out-of-pocket

to

the

expenditures

normally billed to clients in matters of this kind.
60.

The Court finds that Smiths' counsel has agreed to

render legal services for just and fair rates and that Defendants
Smiths have agreed to pay and are obligated to pay their counsel
fair and reasonable legal rates for his services.
61.

Evidence has been submitted that $100.00 per hour is a

just, fair and reasonable rate of compensation for the services
of Smiths1

counsel in this complex and difficult litigation.

Said evidence consists of the proffered testimony of attorney
Stephen Henriod; the opinion testimony of Smiths' counsel and
the oral concession of Western's counsel that $100.00 per hour is
what

he

normally

charges

and

upon

evidence

in

the

records

suggesting that $100.00 per hour was charged Western by its
separate counsel, Bert Dart.
62.

The Court

considering

the

finds said rate to fair and reasonable

complexity

of

the

factual

and

legal

issues

presented by this case, the changing nature of the claims made
and the difficult course this case has followed after the midtrial settlement and on appeal and post-appeal.
the

rate

of

$100.00

per

hour

The Court finds

is consistent with the rates

customarily charged in the area for similar services, and that
24

GO

the

work

performed

represent

Smiths,

was

reasonably

both

in

necessary

their

defense

to

and

adequately
in

seeking

indemnif ication.
63.

The Court finds that 176.75 hours were necessarily

expended respecting Smiths' defense through January 6, 1986 and
that an additional 22 hours of legal services of a defensive
nature were rendered on January 7 and 8, 1986, making a total of
198.75 hours for defense services to that point, for which a
reasonable
$19,875.00

indemnification
together

with

award

for

reasonable

attorney's

out-of-pocket

fees

is

expenses,

customarily added to legal fees, to that point in the sum of
$2 52.07,

making

total

indemnifiable

defense

expense

for

attorney's fees and costs to that point the sum of $20,127.07.
64.

An

additional

358.80 hours have—-beef*—necessarily

*\

expended by—SmithsJ—-counsel™ifi—rendering—services—related—to ~f^L **, '
obtaining-and- defending-i-ndemni-fieat-i-on—for- the Smiths both as to
their time and- as—to--their— legal—expense—after—the—mid-trial
settlement between - other---parties—in—obtaining and defending the
initial award on appeal, requesting that the—case be reheard and
resisting Western's motion-for release - of— its—supersedeas bond
substitute —and— -reviewing—and—analyzing—the—Interrogatories
received

from

Western

directed

Smiths

-post-appeal—and—in

preparing Answers in response -thereto-and in- assembling material,
including affidavits, and memoranda for submission to the trial
court with-respect to the indemnification issues.
25
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\

6 5.

Said—services—would—not—have—been—neuessaiy—btrt—f or

Western' s action in contesting- indemrvi-fieateion- and—the—amount -JL
VN
r C

thereof after control of Western passed-to~PlaintiffG ooon after
the - point of the- -mid-trial— -setetelementr-----between—Plaintiffs—and

\

William-—Bower bank—In--which--the- late-ter—agrood—Plaintiffs—eeuld
select—their—own~Board—of—Slreeteors for Western.
the

appeal

and

Western filed

additional- motions- - post --appeal—and—otherwise

continued -to- resist—Smiths?—legit-imate—Indemnification—claims,
thus creating the necessity--the- Smiths—continue—fee—incur—legal
expense in-seeking indemnification.
66.
reasonably

The Cour-t -f-inds—all—sueh—additional—legal—expense
incurred

indemnification

in

connection —with—-obtaining—the—very

-provided —for- —a—-corporate

. \_

officer/director

V

V

successful on the - merits—or—otherwise—in—defending—against—an
actual proceeding- brought—against -him—by—reason of the fact that
he was a director, officer-, -employee-or^-agent of the corporation,
within the scope, intent and fair - meaning—of—Section—16 104 (o) ( 3 ) Utah Code Annotated- (1953) as- that—section stood at the
time this action-was--filed.
67.

The Cou-r-t—finds-t-hat—tee-deny—indemnification for legal _>.

services- and~costs-of - obtaining—ifidemnif icatien->—including those
rendered—on—appeal -and -post- -appea-li—so-as -to effectively require
Smiths—te—bear- and—pay—such—expensed s—contrary—to—the plain
intent—of~~±he indemnification—statute-- wh-ieh—is—tee—remove—the
burden of litigation expense from corporate-offleers-?—directors
26
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V

v

\y ^

and agents—successful

on—the—meriirs-;—or—uLheiwise,—in—their

defense.
68.

A

reasonable

attorney1 3

fee

for

such—additional

services^—at- -said—rate—of—$4^-0.00—-per—hour,—is—the—sum—of

3 \^
^

\

recoverable—the- -additional—out-of-pocket—expenses—incurred

in

connection -with such—additional—services—In the sum of $875.37,
making—-the

total—--additionally

i ne ludi ng^—the —expense

recoverable

of-—seeking

legal

indemnification

expense,
through

Septen^er'-ieT-l-^B^^^t-he-sum-^f -$-36,755.37.
69.

The

Court does not find that Plaintiffs asserted

unmeritorious claims against Smiths in bad faith, and for that
reason finds the provisions of Section 78-27-56

(U.C.A.) not

applicable to Smiths1 claims for legal expense.
70.

The Court finds and rules that the indemnification

expense award to which Willard L. Smith has been found entitled
in the sum of $6,835.89, the indemnification expense award to
which Keith C. Smith has been found entitled in the sum of
$8,470.00
entitled

and the indemnification
for reasonable

attorney's

award

to which Smiths are

fees and costs for their

successful defense in the sum of $20,127.07 should bear interest
at the legal rate of 10% per annum compounded annually from the
time such indemnification should have been paid, to wit:

January

8, 1986.
71.

In contemplation of law, Western's statutory duty to
27

r

.
V.

pay indemnification became fixed at least by that time.

Smiths

^R

entitlemex^fe—was t.hen complete and—reasonable known standards of \

v.*

value-have -been -followed

%

by-~*he—Court-—and—eould—have—been

followed by Western in paying -indemnification.—To al-l-ow interest

'<|
f

on amounts awarded- -simply -place—the -Smiths—in—statu—gue—and
nothing -short- of - allowing—-interest--would—give—them—proper
indemnrfieatrion- HE or—'thei~r—defense—expenses—contemplated by—the
indemnification -statute.
72 .
expense

The—Gou^t—-f-i-nds—and—rules—that—the—indemnification -y^.
award

attorney's

to

which

Smiths

fees and other

are

entitled -for-—reasonable *-)

legal expense -incurred—in—seeking

^c^*/

indemnification, including services through Western's appeal and
post-appeal proceedings in the sum of $36,755.37—should bear
interest at -the legal rate -of 10% per annum compounded—annually
from the time of post-trial evidentiary hearing on—September 13,
1989 by which date the Court finds such additional—expense- was
due.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant Willard L. Smith is entitled to judgment

against Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc. for indemnification for
his professional C.P.A. time/expense in his defense in the sum of
$6,835.89 together with interest thereon at the legal rate of 10%

.5,„.. <., «..y..-.r- .. ^

$
per annum from January 8, 1986 compounded
annually.

^.^

28

00*^'

°f

2.

Defendant Keith c. Smith is entitled to judgment against

Western Auto Radiator

Co., Inc. for his professional C.P.A.

time/expense in his defense in the sum of $8,470,00 together with
interest thereon at the legal rate of 10% per annum from January
8, 1986 compounded annually.
3.

"^^

Defendants Smiths are entitled

to judgment against

Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc. for the legal expense Smiths
reasonably incurred in their successful defense in the sum of
$19,875.00 plus costs of $252.07 together with interest on said
sums at the legal rate of 10% per annum from January 8, 1986
compounded annually.
4.

Def-endan-fes—Smiths—are—en-ti t led - ~ta~~3-udgme**fe—ag^ins t
r

Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc. for Smiths reasonable attorney! s ^ ^ *v

V V

fees

a-ad---associated-

legal --expense

incurred

in

seeking

indemnification including defending the - appeal—taken by Western
and in post-appeal proceedings in the sum of $36,-~75S-r3:^-^feogether
with interest thereon at the legal rate of 10% per~~annum from
September 13, 1989 compounded annually.
MADE AND ENTERED this / & day of /

±±-

( Q^\_ f
J

19*0.

BY THE COURT:
(
jL.

' f- s

M,/

DEAN &• CONDER
District Judge
Served

the

foregoing

form
29

of

Findings

of

Fact

and

V

Conclusions

of

Law

by mailing

a

copy

thereof

to James A.

Mclntyre, attorney for Plaintiffs, 360 East 4500 South, Suite #3,
Murray, Utah 84107, this

j'p

day of February, 1990.

T)SUL*t~-
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ADDENDUM III
AMENDED JUDGMENT
Dated April 18, 1990
Filed July 25, 1990

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

IjdsJi!

JUL 2 5 1990

DAVID S. COOK #0715
Attorney for Defendants Smith
85 West 400 North
Bountiful, UT 84010
Telephone: 292-7216
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN' AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BLAINE GOODRICH, DAVID HOYT,
VAL KIDMAN, STERLING JONES,
and DANIEL WAYMAN,
)
)

Plaintiffs,

WESTERN AUTO RADIATOR CO,, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and WILLIAM
W. BOWERBANK, JONATHAN BOWERBANK,
KIM BOWERBANK, WILLARD L. SMITH,
KEITH C. SMITH,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

AMENDED JUDGMENT

Case No. C84-924
(Judge Dean E. Conder)

)

This matter was tried before the Court on December 10th,
11th and 13th, 1985 and again on January 8th and 9th, 1986.
Plaintiffs Blaine Goodrich, David Hoyt, Val Kidman, Sterling
Jones and Daniel Wayman were represented by James A. Mclntyre
#2196, 360 East 4500 South, Suite Three, Salt Lake City, Utah
84107-0280, Telephone 266-3399.

Defendant Western Auto Radiator

Co., Inc. was represented by Bert L. Dart #818, 310 South Main,
Suite

1330, Salt Lake City, Utah

Defendants

William

W.

84101, Telephone 521-6383.

Bowerbank, Jonathan

Bowerbank

and Kim

Bowerbank were represented by Michael F. Heyrend #1480 and Thomas
P. Melloy #3664, Watkiss & Campbell, 310 South Main Street, Suite

ooirsi

1200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, Telephone 363-3300. Defendants
Willard L. Smith and Keith C. Smith were represented by David S.
Cook #715, 85 West 400 North Bountiful, Utah 84010, Telephone
292-7216.
On

January

9th,

1986,

the

Plaintiffs

and

Defendants

Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc., William W. Bowerbank, Jonathan
Bowerbank and Kim Bowerbank advised the court they had agreed to
a settlement of the issues among those parties, the terms of
which were stated for the record and the terms of which were
incorporated in a stipulation between those parties dated January
31, 1986 on file herein.
The

Court

indemnification

reserved
for

the issue of the Smiths' claim for

professional

C.P.A.

time

and

for

their

attorney's fees.
Evidence was proffered upon said issues on January 9, 1986
and thereafter affidavits and memorandum were submitted.
The Court ruled on said reserved issues on May 5, 1986 and
on May 8, 1986 signed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a
judgment against Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc. only.
Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc. appealed the judgment.
Utah

Supreme

Court

referred

the

case

The

to the Utah Court of

Appeals, which issued a Memorandum Decision on March 16, 1988
and,

following

a

Petition

for

Rehearing,

a

second

Amended

Memorandum Decision on May 9, 1988, in which the Utah Court of
Appeals remanded the case for such reassessment of the judgment
2

as might be appropriate

and for the entry of more detailed

findings of fact.
Following remand, Defendants Smith responded to a motion
made by Western for release of the supersedeas bond substitute
and responded to written discovery requests made by Western and
as part of their responses annexed comprehensive summaries of
services.

Additional sworn written evidence was submitted by

Smiths in the form of an Affidavit of Keith C. Smith dated March
27, 1989 and Affidavits of David S. Cook dated March 27, 1989 and
September 12, 1989.
The parties submitted additional memoranda and on September
13, 1989 an evidentiary hearing was held at which testimony was
taken and at which it was stipulated in open court that the
affidavits and supporting documents submitted by Smiths could be
received in evidence, the same as though the witnesses had so
testified.
The case having been fully submitted and argued and the
Court having considered the evidence and memoranda submitted by
the parties, and having heretofore made and entered Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing,
JUDGEMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED against Western Auto Radiator
Co., Inc. and in favor of Willard L. Smith and Keith C. Smith as
follows:
1.

Judgment is hereby entered against Western Auto Radiator

Co., Inc. in favor of Willard L. Smith in the sum of $6,835.89
3

together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from
January 8, 1986 simple interest.
2.

Judgment is hereby entered against Western Auto Radiator

Co., Inc. in favor of Keith C. Smith in the sum of $8,470.00
together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from
January 8, 1986 simple interest.
3.

Judgment is hereby entered against Western Auto Radiator

Co., Inc. in favor of Willard L. Smith and Keith C. Smith in the
sum of $20,127.07 attorney's fees and costs for Smiths' defense
together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from
January 8, 1986 simple interest.
The address of the judgment debtor, Western Auto Radiator
Co., Inc. is

567 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

The Employer I.D. Number of Defendant Western Auto Radiator Co,
Inc. is

87-0272096.

MADE AND ENTERED effective the 18th day of April, 1990.
J^

BY THE COURT:
/

\

- , . / ^ ^

DEAN E. CONDER,
District Judge
Served the foregoing form of Amended Judgment by mailing a
copy thereof to James A. Mclntyre, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 360
East 4500 South, Suite Three, Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-0280,
this

^

day of July, 1990.
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